Thursday, 8 December 2011

Arrogance of China

G Parthasarathy

 
India is not a vassal state which will kowtow to the Middle Kingdom and do its bidding. China must realise and accept this truth.


China’s new generation of leaders, led by Vice-President Xi Jinping, and popularly known as ‘Princelings’, will take charge within a year. They will inherit the mantle of ruling a country that has astounded the world by its path-breaking economic transformation. But they will also face challenges of having to deal with reconciling the contradictions between an open economy on the one hand, and an authoritarian and opaque political system on the other.

This in an era when people are increasingly yearning for democratic freedoms. The Hu Jintao era has been marked by a distinct effort to subsume democratic aspirations by increasing resort to jingoism, reflecting what the Soviet Union once described as “Great Han Chauvinism.” Military muscle was flexed and territorial claims on its neighbours, ranging from Japan and Vietnam to the Philippines and India, asserted. Will the new leadership follow this line? Or will it seek to address democratic aspirations by greater openness and transparency? These questions are exercising the minds of Governments worldwide.

Just prior to the East Asia Summit on November 19, the Communist Party  of China mouthpiece, the <i>People’s Daily</i>, launched a broadside against India’s plans to bolster its defences on its eastern border, warning that China had “precision guided weapons” to “easily” eliminate any new forces India deploys. The article was critical of India’s expanding defence ties with China’s neighbours like Japan and Vietnam. China was, in effect, telling India that while it had the right to assist Pakistan to develop a new generation of plutonium-based nuclear weapons and guided missiles, India should not dare to develop defence ties with its neighbours like Japan and Vietnam.

The Chinese diatribe against India continued even after the East Asia Summit. The official Chinese news agency, <i>Xinhua</i>, circulated an article on November 24 which commenced with a reference to “India’s jitters at the sight of China gaining prestige in Asia”. The article alluded to the 1962 border conflict when India “was beaten by the Chinese Army”. It gratuitously mentioned: “Jealousy can sometimes be put in the same breath as inferiority”.

Such Chinese rhetoric is not confined to India. All China’s neighbours that contest its irredentist claims of the entire South China Sea being an area of its “core interest” have experienced similar behaviour and rhetoric. Incidents in the East China Sea across disputed maritime boundaries with Japan have led to Japanese vessels being rammed by Chinese ships, followed by a ban on export of rare earth materials by China to Japan. The Philippines has witnessed the Chinese using force to enforce maritime boundary claims and Vietnam has periodically been subject to Chinese military force over disputed boundaries. China adopts a similar approach to issues of maritime boundaries in relations with South Korea and Taiwan. The Chinese now openly boast about possessing missile power to target aircraft carriers of America’s Pacific Fleet.

While China insisted that it would handle differences on its maritime boundaries with countries like Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia bilaterally, India made the point at the East Asia Summit in Bali that issues involving maritime boundaries and freedom of navigation have to be settled in conformity with the provisions of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Seas. Roughly 40 per cent of India’s trade with the United States traverses through the South China Sea. Moreover, its entire trade with Japan and South Korea traverses through waters claimed by China to be areas of its “core interest”. In these circumstances, undefined and contested maritime boundaries, where one party appears ever ready to use force, are seen as an impediment and inhibiting factor in the freedom of navigation.

The East Asia Summit also saw another significant development. Despite Chinese reservations, five ASEAN member-states —Singapore, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam and Thailand — together with India, Australia and the US raised the issue of maritime boundaries and freedom of navigation at Bali. Russia, Indonesia and five other members talked in general terms about maritime security. Only Myanmar and Cambodia avoided any reference to the issue. An embarrassed Premier Wen Jiabao, who was described by American participants as being “a little bit grouchy at first,” sounded conciliatory, but did not give up Chinese insistence on dealing with each neighbour separately and bilaterally. But, with the Americans deciding to participate actively in the East Asia Summit and reinforcing their security commitment in the Asia-Pacific, by agreeing to the deployment of forces at Darwin in Australia, the ASEAN states now appear satisfied that Chinese “assertiveness” will not  go on unchallenged.

China would also have not failed to notice that the Australian decision to review and change its policies regarding the sale of uranium to India was announced during US President Barack Obama’s visit to Australia. This, after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton coined the new term “Indo-Pacific” to describe the Asia-Pacific Region during formal bilateral discussions with Australia. To add to China’s concerns, which have been reflected in the Chinese media, Mr Obama announced that Ms Clinton would soon visit Myanmar, which the Chinese regard as their backyard. This, at a time when Myanmar’s new dispensation is showing signs of wanting to get free of China’s suffocating embrace.

India’s answer to Chinese diplomatic bluster was effectively given on November 22 when its candidate for a place in the UN’s Joint Inspection Unit, Mr A Gopinathan,  trounced his Chinese rival, Mr Zhang Yan by 106 votes to 77. Mr Zhang Yan, currently China’s Ambassador to India is best known for his arrogance. He recently told a Indian journalist who had asked him a question about Chinese maps depicting the whole of Jammu & Kashmir as Pakistani territory to “shut up”. A Mandarin speaking friend of mine who met Zhang Yan just after he had arrived in India was shocked when the envoy arrogantly remarked: “The Indian media must understand that they cannot treat China in this manner.” India is not a Chinese vassal state, forever ready to kowtow to the whims of the Middle Kingdom’s envoy, Mr Ambassador.

The decision to invite the Dalai Lama to address a Global Buddhist Conference in Delhi was laudable. Timing this conference to coincide with a visit to Delhi by State Councillor Dai Bingguo for talks on the border issue smacked of diplomatic ineptitude. Worse still, succumbing to Chinese pressure and cancelling the participation of the President and the Prime Minister in the conference was craven and demeaning.

http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/item/50633-arrogance-of-china.html

Myanmar is changing


G Parthasarathy

 It's in India's national interest to rapidly improve relations with Myanmar. But India's track record in implementing programmes remains abysmal.

Western attempts to impose ‘regime change’ in West Asia have had unexpected results. The American invasion of Iraq not only exacerbated Shia-Sunni tensions within the country but also produced a virtual Shia-dominated ‘Iraq-Iran’ condominium, challenging the regional supremacy of neighbouring Sunni Gulf sheikhdoms led by Saudi Arabia. It remains to be seen whether the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi will convert Libya into a haven of secular democracy and tribal harmony. Libya’s new rulers are already talking of imposing Sharia’h.

Democracy cannot be imported. It has to emerge and be nurtured from within. Nearer India, the Americans have supported military or military-backed regimes in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Thailand for decades. For over 25 years they backed the regime of Burma’s military dictator General Ne Win, whose main contribution to relations with India was his expulsion of over half-a-million Indians from the country. When the new military junta took over in 1988, the Americans suddenly rediscovered the virtues of democracy in that country.

As Prime Minister, PV Narasimha Rao decided that given their history, the Burmese would evolve their own ways towards more representative Government and that India’s long-term interests were best served if the military regime was constructively engaged, adopting policies akin to those of its ASEAN neighbours. India’s pragmatic approach has paid significant dividends. Myanmar and India share a 1,640-km land border. Myanmar has cooperated constructively in dealing with cross-border insurgencies afflicting some of India’s north-eastern States.

Myanmar has respected India’s security concerns arising from its increasing military cooperation with China. It conclusively established that reports about it providing facilities to China in its Coco Islands were baseless. Moreover, it assuaged India’s concerns about providing base facilities for the Chinese Navy in the port of Sittwe by agreeing that India would construct this port and build a corridor giving its landlocked north-eastern States access to the sea. Thousands of ‘stateless’ people of Indian origin have been assured Myanmar citizenship.

The recent visit of Myanmar’s President Thein Sein to India came just after he had taken a series of measures which have been widely welcomed. These included the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and the commencement of dialogue with her. On October 12, as many as 6,359 detainees were released. They included such notables as Ashin Gambara of the All-Burma Monks Association who led the street protests in 2007, comedian and social activist Zarganar who criticised the Government’s response to the travails of victims of Cyclone Nargis, and the head of the Shan State Army insurgent group.

Mr Thein Sein has also signed preliminary peace agreements with the two eastern armed groups. Non-Burmese ethnic groups now have a say in their own future, after the recent elections enabled them, for the first time in history, to elect their representatives to the newly established Assemblies for States and Regions in the country.

Yielding to public protests, the Government has halted construction in the Kachin State of a $3.6 billion hydro-electric project which was being built with Chinese assistance. Behind the seeming bonhomie rifts are emerging in China-Myanmar relations. In the past two decades, millions of Chinese have moved into Myanmar from neighbouring Yunnan and other Chinese Provinces.

These Chinese now virtually own all the choice properties, pushing the Burmese to the outskirts in cities like Mandalay. Ethnic Chinese now control major businesses across Myanmar and swarms of Chinese workers dominate the construction of Chinese-aided projects. Networks of Chinese-built roads in Myanmar appear designed to give China access to the Bay of Bengal, facilitating the movement of goods, oil and gas, bypassing the Straits of Malacca.

The situation on Myanmar’s border with China is a matter of concern within the country. In the Wa Hills tribesmen of Chinese origin are actively involved in gun-running, including to Indian insurgent groups. Tensions along the border further north emerged when the powerful Mandarin-speaking militia of the Kokang tribe refused to become part of the Myanmar Government’s border militia.

In the ensuing military crackdown, over 20,000 Kokang tribesmen fled across the border into China. Alarmed at the prospect of a similar crackdown on the Wa Army, Chinese leaders, including future President Xi Jinping and Premier Wen Jiabao, visited Yangon last year with promises of further aid. The situation was defused, but resentment against the millions of Chinese settlers and their Wa and Kokang compatriots could blow up any moment, as they did in 1967.

Myanmar’s rulers have no illusions that India can replace China as a partner for rapid growth of their infrastructure. India’s track record in Myanmar has been abysmal. Work on the much-touted Kaladan corridor linking Myanmar to the sea proceeds at a snail’s pace. After ‘consideration’ for over 15 years, India has not even finalised a project report for a 1,500-MW hydro-electric project across Chindwin adjacent to Manipur.

Mr Thein Sein is naturally looking for new tie-ups with more dynamic countries like Japan, which has described recent developments in Myanmar as a positive “step towards democratisation and national reconciliation”. Japan has agreed to resume economic and cultural exchanges and its aid programme, suspended now for two decades. Indonesia has reacted similarly.

Western sanctions, however, are unlikely to end in the immediate future. There now seems to be a clear divide between Asia and the Western world on how to approach relations with Myanmar. It will take around a decade before Myanmar enjoys democratic freedoms akin to those prevalent in neighbouring Indonesia.

Comparing his country’s relations with India and China, a senior Myanmar leader once remarked: “While we may have to go to Beijing for arms, as devout Buddhists we have to go to Bodh Gaya for salvation.”  Sadly, the reality is that in Buddhist countries, ranging from Sri Lanka to Thailand and beyond, the main factor that inhibits their devotees from visiting India is what is described as the “primitive” and “pathetic” facilities available for pilgrims and tourists interested in visiting Buddhist heritage and pilgrimage sites.

Across the world people have commented on the efficiency and precision with which the Formula 1 event was conducted in the National Capital Region, while recalling the inefficiency, mismanagement and corruption that marked the arrangements for the Commonwealth Games. One hopes that New Delhi will draw up a realistic public-private partnership for providing modern amenities, accommodation and infrastructure for tourists and pilgrims visiting Buddhist heritage sites to complement its plans for the development of Nalanda University.

 http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/item/50430-myanmar-is-changing.html

Can you hear the Chinese whispers grow louder?



By pressuring New Delhi to deny the Dalai Lama a public platform of "any form," Beijing is seeking to undercut the exiled Tibetan leader's value for India.


 

 

 

 

 

Can you hear the Chinese whispers grow louder?

New moves of an encircler
Just as China is seeking to extend its annexation of Tibet to India’s northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, it is seeking to extend its containment of India to the Dalai Lama. And to contain the Dalai Lama, it brazenly demands India’s cooperation.



Brahma Chellaney, The Times of India, December 4, 2011

As geopolitical rivals, India and China face each other over a highly disputed border. The inviolability of virtually the entire 4,057 km border — one of the longest in the world — has been called into question by China’s increasing cross-frontier military incursions and its calculated refusal to mutually draw a fully agreed line of control along the Himalayas.

The amount of Indian land China occupies or openly covets tops 135,000 square kilometres, or approximately the size of Costa Rica. China currently has unresolved land and sea border disputes with 11 other neighbours. But in comparison with China’s territorial disputes with other neighbours now or even in the past, its land disputes with India stand out for their sheer size and importance.

Beijing’s last-minute postponement of a scheduled round of border talks constitutes no real loss for New Delhi because China has used these 30-year-long negotiations to keep India engaged while blocking any real progress. Even as Beijing has since 2006 provocatively revived its claim to Arunachal Pradesh and concurrently stepped up cross-border forays in all sectors, New Delhi has stayed locked in these fruitless talks.

Let’s be clear: These talks, constituting the longest and the most-barren process between any two nations post-World War II, have only aided the Chinese strategy to mount more military pressure while working to hem in India behind the cover of engagement.

For example, by deploying several thousand troops in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and playing the Kashmir card against India in various ways, China has clearly signalled its intent to squeeze India on Jammu and Kashmir. The military pressure China has built up on Arunachal may just be tactical. The plain fact is that India’s vulnerability in J&K has been heightened by the new Chinese military encirclement.

To help undermine the Dalai Lama’s role, Beijing is now exerting pressure on India to deny the Tibetan leader any kind of public platform. The recent diplomatic spat, as the Chinese foreign ministry has acknowledged, was not just about the Dalai Lama’s address to a religious conference that overlapped with the now-scrapped talks. Rather, Beijing brashly insists that India not provide him a public platform of “any form.”

Beijing draws encouragement from its success in bringing India’s Tibet stance in full alignment with the Chinese line. In 2003, the aging and ailing Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee surrendered India’s last remaining leverage on Tibet when he formally recognized the cartographically dismembered Tibet that Beijing calls the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as “part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.” In recent years, even as Beijing has mocked India’s territorial integrity, New Delhi has not sought to subtly add some flexibility to its Tibet stance.

In fact, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s climbdown in first suspending bilateral defence exchanges and then meekly resuming them has only emboldened Beijing. India froze defence exchanges in response to Beijing’s stapled-visa policy on J&K and its refusal to allow the Northern Command chief to head an Indian military delegation to China. Yet Singh personally delivered a two-in-one concession to Beijing earlier this year, agreeing to resume defence talks by delinking them from the stapled-visa issue and dropping the Northern Command chief as the Indian military team’s leader.

Even in the latest dust-up, where was the need for the Indian President to first agree to inaugurate the international Buddhist conference and then chicken out even after the Chinese had cancelled the scheduled border talks? The Prime Minister too backed out from the conference, where he was to be the “guest of honour.”

Just as Beijing compelled New Delhi to climb down on the defence talks, it is likely to drive a hard bargain on the border talks, even though their indefinite suspension can only help bare the actions of the encircler, which wishes to expand its 1951 Tibet annexation to Arunachal.

China has upped the ante on the Dalai Lama because it recognizes that he remains a major strategic asset
for India. By asking New Delhi to go beyond denying him a political platform to denying him even a religious platform, it is seeking to extend its containment of India to the Dalai Lama. And it wants India’s help in this endeavour.

Actually, China has embarked on a larger strategy to cement its rule on an increasingly restive Tibet by bringing Tibetan Buddhism under the tight control of an atheist state. From its capture of the Panchen Lama institution to its decree to control the traditional process of finding the reincarnation of any senior lama who passes away, Beijing is acting long term. It is also waiting to install its own marionette as the next Dalai Lama when the present incumbent dies. Only India can foil this broader strategy — and it must for the sake of its own interests.

The writer is a strategic analyst.
(c) The Times Of India, 2011. http://goo.gl/0Bwp0

 http://chellaney.net/category/diplomacy/

MYANMAR IN THE MIDDLE - China embrace too strong for Naypyidaw




MYANMAR IN THE MIDDLE
China embrace too strong for Naypyidaw
By Bertil Lintner

This is the first article in a four-part series.
Tomorrow: India-Myanmar: a half-built gateway
JIEGAO, Yunnan province - This tiny enclave south of the Shweli river belongs to China but is completely surrounded on land by Myanmar. Its unique position has given rise to a boomtown like no other in western Yunnan province, a bustling exit point for Chinese goods destined for Myanmar and beyond.

Shops in Jiegao sell everything from electronic goods, household appliances, motorcycles, garments, medicines, fake DVDs and bizarre sex toys. One shop displays two huge, 12-wheel trucks in a glassed showroom facing one of the town's broad new boulevards. Jade and precious stones from Myanmar are on sale here as well.


Burmese jade sold in a Chinese market. All pictures by Bertil Lintner
The cross-border trade, however, weighs heavily in China's favor.

In 2009, the last year for which official statistics are available, Chinese exports to Myanmar amounted to US$2.3 billion while imports were a mere $646 million. Some projections put the current export figure closer to $4 billion. Jiegao's exports are not confined to Myanmar, with local markets in northeastern India and as far as Bangladesh flooded with cheap Chinese consumer goods.

Considering that only two decades ago Jiegao consisted of little more than a cluster of bamboo huts, this has been no mean achievement. A new, wide bridge connecting the enclave with the rest of Yunnan north of the river was first built in 1992. At the same time, before high-rise buildings and shopping complexes were built, a giant monument was erected near the bridge, showing three figures pushing what looks like a circular object between them with their determined faces pointing south.


The Chinese monument in Yunnan .

"Southeast Asia, here we come!" a local resident joked when this correspondent first visited Jiegao in late 1994.

Yet it hasn't been as easy to push that wheel south as the Chinese likely first expected. For more than two decades now, Chinese companies have plundered northern Myanmar of its natural resources, including timber, which has led to massive deforestation especially in the country's northern Kachin State. Rampant logging by Chinese companies in the area have led to floods, landslides and other natural disasters never before experienced in that part of the country.

According to a report by the international environmental watchdog Global Witness, this trade continues despite an official Chinese ban imposed in 2006 on the importation of timber from Myanmar. "Half of China's timber imports from all countries are probably illegal," the investigative report stated. Timber depots in western Yunnan and shops selling processed wood products are still widely available in China-Myanmar border areas. "They're buying everything, small trees, big trees, even the roots," laments a local Myanmar resident on the border referring to still active Chinese importers.


A truck carrying Chinese goods across the Myanmar-China border
Chinese ambitions for northern Myanmar have since grown. On June 16, 2009, Myanmar's Beijing ambassador Thein Lwin and the president of China Power Investment Corporation Lu Qizhou signed a Memorandum of Agreement for the joint "Development, Operation and Transfer of the hydropower Projects in Maykha, Malikha and Upstream of Irrawaddy-Myitsone River Basin". The biggest of these dams at Myitsone, or the confluence of the Maykha and Malikha rivers, which the local ethnic Kachins call N'Mai Hka and Mali Hka, was scheduled to cost $3.6 billion and flood more than 700 square kilometers of forestland. Around 90% of the electricity generated by the massive dam was to be exported to China.

The Burmanization of the names of the two main rivers in Kachin State was not the only insult to the local population. "Myitsone" is a new Burmese name which means "river junction", or the confluence of two rivers. Previously, a Kachin village known as Tanghpre was located there but its inhabitants were forcibly evicted before the Chinese construction crews moved in. It was renamed by the central Myanmar government and an entirely new settlement was built around a Buddhist pagoda in a predominantly Christian part of the country.

In April 2010, a series of bomb attacks were launched against the site. No culprits were caught but local sources say disgruntled local Kachin residents were behind the attacks. The Myitsone dam controversy later grew from a local to national issue, fuelling nationalistic sentiments even among the majority Burman population. This led to Myanmar President Thein Sein's stunning announcement on September 30 that the entire China-backed project would be suspended because it was against "the wishes of the people". Ten days prior, Myanmar police had arrested a lone protester who had demonstrated against the dam outside the Chinese Cultural Office in the old capital Yangon.

Diplomatic naivete
The Chinese were stunned by the official decision. If they had followed recent developments more carefully and had a better grasp of Myanmar history they wouldn't have been. Casual conversations with local residents in the border areas reveal a deep distrust of China - and anger at its designs for Myanmar. But Chinese officials have displayed an astounding naivete in their analyses of the situation.

A typical example of that shallow understanding is a paper titled "Sino-Myanmar Relation and its Prospect" (sic) by Wang Jun-fu, vice president of the Chinese military's International Liaison Department of the General Political Department, publicly known as the China Association for International Friendly Contacts. (The department prepares political and economic information for China's top leaders.)

Written and presented in May 1995, just as the Chinese had penetrated Myanmar to the extent that they believed the situation was irreversible, Wang writes about a fictitious "joint struggle" of the "two peoples" against "imperialism and colonialism". The writer lists numerous visits to Myanmar made by Chinese officials and states among much empty language that "two-thousand years" of history "proves that friendly cooperation is the melody of Sino-Myanmar ties".

What Wang conspicuously failed to mention was the vicious, anti-Chinese riots that rocked Yangon's Chinatown in 1967, which were followed by two decades of massive Chinese support for the insurgent Communist Party of Burma. He also failed to note that the Chinese government at that time branded Myanmar's then strongman military leader Ne Win as a fascist and Red Guards surrounded the Myanmar embassy in Beijing shouting anti-Myanmar (then known as Burma) slogans day and night over loudspeakers.

In more recent years, Myanmar has seen a huge influx of immigrant workers, black market traders and gamblers from China. According to Global Witness, 30% to 40% of the population of the northern Myanmar city of Mandalay is now Chinese. As early as 1988, a local author, Nyi Pu Lay, wrote a short critical story titled The Python which highlighted the influx of Chinese to Mandalay, the old royal capital of Myanmar. Nyi Pu Lay was subsequently arrested and released after spending several years in prison for his writings. Nyi Pu Lay is the youngest son of Mandalay's perhaps most famous literary couple, the late Ludu U Hla and Daw Ahma, lending local weight to his reputation and message.

Chinese economic penetration of Myanmar began in the early 1980s and was facilitated, but not caused, by Western isolation of the country after the military's brutal suppression of a nationwide pro-democracy uprising in 1988. But it should have been clear to observers that it was an uneasy relationship from the beginning. The recent turnaround, epitomized by the stoppage of the Myitsone dam, was not as assumed by many driven by the 2010 elections and the shift towards a nominally democratic government made up mainly of former military officers.

As one Myanmar observer put it, Myanmar's "new look" government was designed to give the regime a more friendly international face and provide a convenient opportunity to unveil policies that had been in store for several years - policies which ironically have been promoted by staunchly nationalistic, hard-line army officers. When asked if Myanmar army officers had simply changed their uniforms for civilian clothes, one local Yangon resident recently quipped: "No! They have put their suits on over their uniforms."

According to several sources, the first bilateral blow against China came in October 2004 when then prime minister and former intelligence chief Lt Gen Khin Nyunt was ousted, charged with corruption and given a stiff prison sentence which was later converted to house arrest. Khin Nyunt was considered "China's man" in Myanmar and a well-placed source with access to inside information says that the Chinese could not at first believe he had been ousted. Both sides managed to smooth things over and bilateral relations later appeared to return to normal after the internal purge.

The next big blow to bilateral ties came in August 2009 when the Myanmar Army moved into the Kokang area of northeastern Shan State. Populated mainly by local ethnic Chinese, Kokang had received a considerable influx of residents from across the border. Given the similarities between Kokang Chinese and Yunnanese Chinese, it was not difficult for the latter to obtain local Myanmar ID papers for a fee. While many began to do business in the area, others moved to cities such as Mandalay as legal Myanmar citizens.

The Myanmar Army offensive into Kokang drove more than 30,000 people across the border into China. Chinese authorities allowed only Kokang-based Chinese nationals to cross into China and many ethnic Kokang-Chinese refugees were stopped at the border.

On the Myanmar side, government soldiers beat up Chinese nationals, stole their property and an unknown number of people were killed in the melee. There were also reports of rape of Chinese women. Chinese authorities were outraged by the violence against their citizens but then did nothing, probably hoping that the situation would once again return to normal.

Anti-China promotions
The military operation in Kokang was masterminded by Lt Gen Min Aung Hlaing, then head of the Myanmar military's Bureau of Special Operations 2. The commander on the ground who ordered his soldiers to beat up the Chinese was the head of the 33rd Light Infantry Division, Brig-Gen Aung Kyaw Zaw. Both soldiers have since been promoted for their work.

Min Aung Hlaing has been elevated to joint chief of staff of the defense services - the army, navy and air force - replacing General Thura Shwe Mann, who is one of the top "civilians" in the new setup in Naypyidaw. Aung Kyaw Zaw, meanwhile, has been promoted to a major general and commander of the Northeastern Command of the Myanmar Army based in Lashio. In that new capacity, he is in charge of most of the border areas which are under the government's control, including the economically and strategically important trading post at Jiegao.

Myanmar's move towards a new China policy thus more clearly began in 2004, not after the 2010 election. An important internal document compiled by Lt Col Aung Kyaw Hla, a researcher at Myanmar's Defense Services Academy, seems to have set the stage for this policy shift. His 346-page confidential thesis, entitled "A Study of Myanmar-US Relations", outlines specifically many of the policies now being implemented, including strategies for improving relations with the US and how to mitigate Myanmar's dependence on China.

Sources with access to inside information about Myanmar's military leadership assert that there is no "power struggle" inside the new government between alleged "hardliners" and "moderates" over democracy and human rights, as suggested by many Western pundits. Many foreign news reports have presented Thein Sein as a reformist leader battling against entrenched forces linked to the previous ruling junta.

Rather, there is a consensus among the military top brass that Myanmar has become too dependent on China and that the country has deviated from its traditional, neutralist foreign policy - a cornerstone for survival for a country squeezed between Asia's two giants, China and India, and with Western-allied Thailand on its eastern flank.

To be sure, these new "democratic" policies seem to be working well. Myanmar has been able to leverage them to strengthen its position within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which recently agreed to allow it to chair the regional bloc in 2014. The country is also reaching out to new power players in the region in a bid to diversify its trade and investment reliance on China.

In particular, Myanmar has recently cemented important ties with Indonesia, seen by many as ASEAN's new anchor. In May, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono held high-profile discussions with Thein Sein in Jakarta, while in June and July two Indonesian deputy ministers with economic portfolios, Mahendra Siregar and Edy Putra Irawady, visited Myanmar. They pledged to increase trade and investments in Myanmar's energy, food production and infrastructure sectors.

More significantly, Gen Min Aung Hlaing, who was appointed commander-in-chief of Myanmar's military in March, took his first foreign trip in mid-November to Vietnam - Beijing's traditional adversary - rather than China. Myanmar and Vietnam share similar fears of their powerful northern neighbor and so it is reasonable to assume that Min Aung Hlaing had much to discuss with his Vietnamese hosts.

Relations with the US are also improving. On December 1, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will visit Myanmar, the first such visit by a high-ranking US official in decades. But, as cynics point out, while paying lip service to human rights and democracy, there is little doubt that the status of China-Myanmar relations will be high on Clinton's diplomatic agenda.

On a visit to Canberra in November, US President Barack Obama stated that "with my visit to the region, I am making it clear that the United States is stepping up its commitment to the entire Asia-Pacific region". The United States is a Pacific power, Obama said, and "we are here to stay". He added: "The notion that we fear China is mistaken. The notion that we are looking to exclude China is mistaken."

The last statement was as unconvincing as Thein Sein's claim that the Myitsone dam project was suspended because he was concerned about "the wishes of the people". Myanmar and the US, two long-time adversaries, may now be on the same side in the emerging regional power struggle with China.

Yet the monumental wheel at Jiegao - China's gateway to Southeast and South Asia - has certainly not stopped turning as Chinese trade and influence continue to grow in Myanmar and beyond. But more friction and perhaps even hostility could color future relations between China and Myanmar, an antagonism that could help the military regime shake its pariah status and isolation from the US.

Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and author of several books on Burma/Myanmar, including the forthcoming Great Game East: India, China and the Struggle for Asia’s Most Volatile Frontier. He is currently a writer with Asia-Pacific Media Services.

 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MK29Ae01.html

How Myanmar is moving ever closer into China’s orbit


Myanmar and its neighbours

The eye of the Buddha

How Myanmar is moving ever closer into China’s orbit

Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia. By Thant Myint-U.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT did not have much time for Burma or the Burmese. The sympathy he felt for Indian demands for independence from Britain did not extend to that other piece of the British Raj now known as Myanmar. In 1942 he wrote to Winston Churchill: “I wish you could put the whole bunch of them into a frying pan with a wall around it and let them stew in their own juice.”

In unforeseen ways, the American president largely got his wish. The military dictatorship under General Ne Win that seized power in Burma in 1962 erected a virtual wall around the country, sealing it off from almost all outside influence. The junta that succeeded him after nationwide protests in 1988 has tried to open up the country. Viewed from the West, its efforts seem vain. Despite a farcical election last year, Myanmar remains subject to Western economic sanctions and its leaders are still largely shunned by their American and European counterparts. The only Burmese politician widely known in the West is Aung San Suu Kyi, an opposition leader who has spent most of the past two decades in detention and whose party is now technically illegal.

Yet Thant Myint-U’s new book shows that it is an illusion to think of Myanmar, as many Westerners do, as small, politically isolated, and economically and geographically peripheral—or as he puts it, “a relatively minor missing link between China and India”. Myanmar is certainly not small. It has perhaps 60m people, and covers an area bigger than France. One of the many ethnic insurgencies strung along Myanmar’s borders, the United Wa State Army, has come to control a territory larger than Belgium.



Moreover, Mr Thant puts Myanmar at the centre of things—exactly midway between Delhi and Mumbai to the west and Shanghai and Hong Kong to the east. Before the generals transformed Rangoon (now Yangon) “from global entrepot to backwater village”, its airport was in British times a hub for all of Asia. Draw a circle around the central city of Mandalay with a radius of just over 700 miles (1,100km), he writes, and it stretches to the states of West Bengal and Bihar in India, to Yunnan and Sichuan provinces in China, as well as to Tibet, and south to cover most of Laos and Thailand (see map). The circle is home to some 600m people.

Mr Thant is an academic historian and the grandson of U Thant, secretary-general of the United Nations in the 1960s. He is controversial among Burmese exiles for advocating engagement with the regime. In 2007 he published the best general introduction to contemporary Myanmar, “The River of Lost Footsteps”, and his latest book adopts the same blend of personal reminiscence, history—enlivened with an eye for the telling anecdote—travelogue and polemic.

This time Mr Thant’s travels take him to Myanmar’s hill country, near the Chinese border, to the other side of the frontier, in Yunnan province, and to Assam and Manipur in north-east India, on Myanmar’s other flank. Some of the travelogue is rather dull, especially in China, where the traveller is linguistically hobbled and confined to well-trodden tourist paths. His contemporary insights add little to his accomplished retelling of history. He is a better analyst and historian than he is a travel writer.

But the book’s main analytical and polemical point is tellingly made: in the absence of a Western counterbalance, Myanmar is falling almost inexorably into the Chinese sphere of influence. There is an age-old dream of linking India and China through Burma. The Victorians even fantasised about a raised railway from Calcutta (now Kolkata), soaring above the jungle.

The dream is at last coming true, as the solution to China’s “Malacca dilemma”—its strategic worry about dependence on imported energy coming through the chokepoint of the Malacca Straits. A new port, oil and gas pipelines, and roads are already under construction, giving China for the first time direct access to the Bay of Bengal, and a new route for as much as 20% of its oil imports. Dams are springing up on Myanmar’s rivers, to generate hydropower to keep the lights burning in Yunnan.

So China’s and Myanmar’s rulers are becoming ever more dependent on each other. Efforts by India and South-East Asian countries to reduce that dependence seem forlorn, despite India’s historic, cultural and religious ties, and despite Myanmar’s membership of the Association of South-East Asian Nations.

The generals in mufti now running Myanmar are fiercely independent. They do not want to be China’s puppets. Indeed, the older ones spent their formative years fighting Chinese-backed communists. Yet the West, with its fastidious refusal to have any truck with them, seems to leave them little option but to cleave to China. As in his earlier book, Mr Thant justly argues against the self-defeating futility of Western sanctions on Myanmar. But it is hard for Western governments to lift them without Ms Suu Kyi’s backing.

And it is hard for her to call for their lifting when so many of her supporters are behind bars, and when her sway over international opinion is the last lever she has over a repellent regime.

 http://www.economist.com/node/21526298

Sunday, 17 July 2011

India China War in 2012 or by 2017? - India Predicts China War by 2017




The Indian army has predicted a war with its nuclear-armed neighbor China by 2017 as Beijing continues to strengthen its military muscle.




A secret military exercise, called 'Divine Matrix', by the Indian troops visualized a war scenario with China, the Hindustan Times reported.

"A misadventure by China is very much within the realm of possibility with Beijing trying to position itself as the only power in the region," a senior army officer told the daily following the maneuver.

An Indian military's assessment has outlined that Beijing would rely on information warfare (IW) to bring New Delhi down on its knees.

Earlier on Wednesday, the Pentagon released a report warning that China was busily trying to arm its forces with weapons that can be used to nullify the superiority of any naval and air power that could disrupt the balance of region.

China is concerned about growing ties between Washington and New Delhi. A controversial deal allowing India access to civilian nuclear technology has not been well-received among Chinese officials.

New Delhi, meanwhile, is suspicious of Chinese relations with India's long-time rival Pakistan.




 But resources believe that China will launch an attack on India before 2012.

There are multiple reasons for a desperate Beijing to teach India the final lesson, thereby ensuring Chinese supremacy in Asia in this century.

Today we are viewing the news on the idea of China to attack India by 2012 because of the fear of supremacy in Asia.

India and China fought a brief but bloody war over border dispute in 1962 with a decisive victory for the Chinese.

Let us wait and see.......... THE END!




1962 War Chinese perspective ! WOW

Here is an reproduction of an article from Chinese Communist Website which says that It was India which was aggressor and China was only fighting A DEFENSIVE BATTLE.

How can china ever fool the world like this

**********************

Facts Behind China-India Border Dispute

October 26, 1962

If a general of the Chinese imperial government representing the Manchu dynasty had, by force of arms, pillage and plunder, succeeded in subjugating the North American continent and on that basis had artificially created a border line between the United States and Canada called, let us say, The Manchu Line, would a sovereign U.S. government abide by thus border line?
Let us suppose further that the boundary line demarcated by this general included, for the Canadian side, parts of Buffalo, Detroit, Seattle and Duluth. Let us suppose again that the treaty between Canada and the U.S. dictated by this general had never been accepted by any government of the United States, and that in truth the people of the U.S. regarded this treaty and its boundary line as illegal, null and void, and as the imposition of a foreign power at a time when the U.S. was weak, divided and under the domination of a foreign imperialist power.
All we have to do with this analogy is to just change the name -- Canada to India, United States to China and China to Great Britain -- and the picture becomes immeasurably clearer than it is represented in the U.S. press.
THE McMAHON LINE
It is the position of the Chinese People's Republic that the so-called McMahon Line -- named after the British General McMahon -- is illegal, null and void, and the result of a predatory, imperialist imposition of the British government in the year 1914.
No Chinese government ever accepted the McMahon Line. Neither did the Imperial Government of China in 1914, nor the Chiang Kai-Shek government ever agree to it. The very fact that even the Chiang Kai-Shek clique, which is nothing but a tool of U.S. imperialism, has not dared to dispute the Chinese People's Republic's position of the China-India border dispute, it in itself the most eloquent testimony to the correctness of the Chinese position.
Nevertheless, the Chinese People's Republic has made every effort to achieve a reasonable and just settlement of the territory in dispute. It has consistently shunned the use of arms.
PROPOSALS FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Although the border dispute is almost three years old now, and the Chinese have made innumerable other approaches to the Indian government to settle it on some amicable and acceptable basis the Nehru government has invariably turned them down. In the past two months alone the Chinese government made several proposals for negotiations.
It made a notable effort on August 4, and another one on September 13. In neither of these proposals did the Chinese government lay down any preconditions for the negotiations. Nor did the Chinese government resort to the type of language which could in any way be construed as a threat to India.
On the contrary, the diplomatic notes directed to the Indian government were couched in the most conciliatory language, and were calculated to effectuate a reasonable settlement which would safeguard the territorial integrity of China as well as India.
As a matter of fact, the London Times, certainly no friend of the Chinese revolutionary government, had to publicly admit on October 8 that if military operations were resumed on the Sino-Indian border, "onlookers will have to note that it was New Dehli . . , that declined to embark upon them (talks) . . ."
The position of the London Times is of exceptional importance because it has always sided with India as against China. The London Times was obliged to make the above statement only after the Indian paper, Tribune, had reported that at a cabinet meeting the Indian government had decided to use armed force to deal with China.
NEHRU'S "LIMITED OFFENSIVE"
It was also reported in the world press on October 8, that Nehru had authorized India's new commander-in chief of the eastern border area to "fight a limited offensive operation."
These are the incontrovertible facts.
As to what lies behind the aggressive attitude of the Nehru government, it must be borne in mind first of all that the imperialist world, particularly the U.S. would like nothing better than to see the two principal Asiatic powers, the two powers which hold the greatest revolutionary promise for mankind in the east, locked in military combat, shedding the blood of thousands, absorbing the resources and energies of millions of people, which should be used to construct a revolutionary way of life.
The efforts of the U.S. government, it must be noted, have been directed, insofar as India is concerned, not only to make it economically and financially dependent upon U.S. monopoly interests, but also to inflame the Indian bourgeoisie, particularly its right-wing extremist elements, against the Chinese People's Republic.
FOUR BILLION U.S. AID
According to The New York Times of October 22(1969), the U.S. has poured into India more than four billion dollars. A substantial section of this money has gone to line the pockets of Indian businessmen, government officials, and especially the extremist elements who are interested in diverting the mass discontent of the Indian peasants and workers into other channels.
U.S. diplomats, State Department planners, and military figures in the Pentagon have for a long time felt that the biggest diversionary tactic that imperialism could employ to disrupt the revolutionary anti-imperialist front was to continually stir up, bribe and corrupt as many of the representatives of the Indian bourgeoisie as it could to fan the flames of an India-China war.
Nehru himself was subjected to unremitting pressure when he was in the U.S. More U.S. aid was used as bait to lure Nehru into the trap of a protracted India-China war, which can only result in further detriment to India, China and the cause of all oppressed people.
SINCE NEHRU'S VISIT
Since the Indian Prime Minister left the shores of the U.S. there have been only rare intervals in which there has been a let up in the war fever fanned by the Indian bourgeoisie and its agent Nehru. For a long time Nehru played the role of moderator between left and right in the Indian-China border dispute, cautioning the extremist elements of the bourgeoisie in Parliament, and repudiating suggestions for offensive operations by his military advisers.
But his October 4 decision, taken after a cabinet meeting, made it clear beyond any shadow of a doubt that he had completely capitulated to the right wing on this issue and was kowtowing to U.S. imperialist interests.
The present military efforts of the Chinese are merely a response to the offensive action taken after the Indian cabinet session.
A DEFENSIVE BATTLE
The Chinese government is fighting a defensive battle. It is only too well aware that U.S. imperialism is ready at all times to take advantage of any preoccupation that China may have with India to open another front against China wherever and whenever it finds it feasible, whether it be in the Pescadores, the Taiwan strait or new harassments over the air space of China.
There are those who say China should give in -- give up what belongs to China in the interest of peace. These are the people who are always ready to give, especially things that do not belong to them.
When to give -- or whether to give -- is a question which only the Chinese can decide, as it as their territory. Surely the Chinese, who have gone through hell and fire in the course of 22 years of civil war, in which they have had to trade many times -- space for time -- and in fact have endured many retreats, need no reminders on this score.
SOLIDARITY OF ASIAN PEOPLE
The workers of the world and the progressive anti-imperialist countries in particular, are most deeply concerned in a speedy, reasonable and honorable settlement on the part of China and India. Such a settlement can only be arrived at if the ruling group in New Delhi accepts China's offer for the resumption of talks on a high level between the two governments without any pre conditions. A border settlement would remove a tremendous obstacle to the solidarity of the Asian people who are struggling for a new life, and would be a tremendous rebuff to imperialism and its servants and underlings.