Wednesday, 25 January 2012

The Water Hegemon - Brahma Chellaney


The Water Hegemon
- Brahma Chellaney

International discussion about China’s rise has focused on its increasing trade muscle, growing maritime ambitions, and expanding capacity to project military power. One critical issue, however, usually escapes attention: China’s rise as a hydro-hegemon with no modern historical parallel. No other country has ever managed to assume such unchallenged riparian preeminence on a continent by controlling the headwaters of multiple international rivers and manipulating their cross-border flows. China, the world’s biggest dam builder – with slightly more than half of the approximately 50,000 large dams on the planet — is rapidly accumulating leverage against its neighbors by undertaking massive hydro-engineering projects ontransnational rivers. Asia’s water map fundamentally changed after the 1949 Communist victory in China. Most of Asia’s important international rivers originate in territories that were forcibly annexed to the People’s Republic of China. The Tibetan Plateau, for example, is the world’s largest freshwater repository and the source of Asia’s greatest rivers, including those that are the lifeblood for mainland China and South and Southeast Asia. Other such Chinese territories contain the headwaters of rivers like the Irtysh, Illy, and Amur, which flow to Russia and Central Asia.

This makes China the source of cross-border water flows to the largest number of countries in the world. Yet China rejects the very notion of water sharing or institutionalized cooperation with downriver countries. Whereas riparian neighbors in Southeast and South Asia are bound by water pacts that they have negotiated between themselves, China does not have a single water treaty with any co-riparian country. Indeed, having its cake and eating it, China is a dialogue partner but not a member of the Mekong River Commission, underscoring its intent not to abide by the Mekong basin community’s rules or take on any legal obligations. Worse, while promoting multilateralism on the world stage, China has given the cold shoulder to multilateral cooperation among river-basin states. The lower-Mekong countries, for example, view China’s strategy as an attempt to “divide and conquer.”

Although China publicly favors bilateral initiatives over multilateral institutions in addressing water issues, it has not shown any real enthusiasm for meaningful bilateral action. As a result, water has increasingly become a new political divide in the country’s relations with neighbors like India, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Nepal.

China deflects attention from its refusal to share water, or to enter into institutionalized cooperation to manage common rivers sustainably, by flaunting the accords that it has signed on sharing flow statistics with riparian neighbors. These are not agreements to cooperate on shared resources, but rather commercial accords to sell hydrological data that other upstream countries provide free to downriver states. In fact, by shifting its frenzied dam building from internal rivers to international rivers, China is now locked in water disputes with almost all co-riparian states. Those disputes are bound to worsen, given China’s new focus on erecting mega-dams, best symbolized by its latest addition on the Mekong — the 4,200-megawatt Xiaowan Dam, which dwarfs Paris’s Eiffel Tower in height — and a 38,000-megawatt dam planned on the Brahmaputra at Metog, close to the disputed border with India. The Metog Dam will be twice as large as the 18,300-megawatt Three Gorges Dam, currently the world’s largest, construction of which uprooted at least 1.7 million Chinese.

In addition, China has identified another mega-dam site on the Brahmaputra at Daduqia, which, like Metog, is to harness the force of a nearly 3,000-meter drop in the river’s height as it takes a sharp southerly turn from the Himalayan range into India, forming the world’s longest and steepest canyon. The Brahmaputra Canyon — twice as deep as the Grand Canyon in the United States – holds Asia’s greatest untapped
water reserves.

The countries likely to bear the brunt of such massive diversion of waters are those located farthest downstream on rivers like the Brahmaputra and Mekong — Bangladesh, whose very future is threatened by climate and environmental change, and Vietnam, a rice bowl of Asia. China’s water appropriations from the Illy River threaten to turn Kazakhstan’s Lake Balkhash into another Aral Sea, which has shrunk to less than half its original size. In addition, China has planned the “Great Western Route,” the proposed third leg of the Great South-North Water Diversion Project — the most ambitious inter-river and inter-basin transfer program ever conceived — whose first two legs, involving internal rivers in China’s ethnic Han heartland, are scheduled to be completed within three years. The Great Western Route, centered on the Tibetan Plateau, is designed to divert waters, including from international rivers, to the Yellow River, the main river of water-stressed northern China, which also originates in Tibet. With its industry now dominating the global hydropower-equipment market, China has also emerged as the largest dam builder overseas. From Pakistani-held Kashmir to Burma’s troubled Kachin and Shan states, China has widened its dam building to disputed or insurgency-torn areas, despite local backlashes. For example, units of the People’s Liberation Army are engaged in dam and other strategic projects in the restive, Shia-majority region of Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan-held Kashmir. And China’s dam building inside Burma to generate power for export to Chinese provinces has contributed to renewed bloody fighting recently, ending a 17-year ceasefire between the Kachin Independence Army and the government.

As with its territorial and maritime disputes with India, Vietnam, Japan, and others, China is seeking to disrupt the status quo on international-river flows. Persuading it to halt further unilateral appropriation of shared waters has thus become pivotal to Asian peace and stability. Otherwise, China is likely to emerge as the master of Asia’s water taps, thereby acquiring tremendous leverage over its neighbors’ behavior.

- Brahma Chellaney, professor at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research, New Delhi.

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Global Geopolitics & Political Economy - B. Raman



Global Geopolitics & Political Economy
- B. Raman
(Based on a talk delivered at a seminar on the Indian Ocean at Bangalore on February 26,2010. It was jointly organized by the Asia Centre, Bangalore, and the Indian Council  of World Affairs, New Delhi )

The main security threats to Indian interests in the Indian Ocean area arise from three factors—firstly, the gradual erosion of the Indian political influence in the area; secondly, the increase in the Chinese presence in the area; and thirdly, the uncontrolled activities of  the Somali pirates.

2.   Nowhere is the erosion of the Indian political influence more evident than in Sri Lanka where despite our assistance to the Government of Sri Lanka in its successful counter-insurgency operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) we have not been able to protect either the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils or the lives and livelihood of Indian Tamil fishermen, who have been repeatedly at the mercy of the Sri Lankan Navy.

3.   Our repeated pleas for finding an early political solution to the grievances of the Sri Lankan Tamils and for stopping attacks—some of them brutal and fatal— on Indian Tamil fishermen have had no impact on the Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa, while pretending to be sensitive to Indian interests, has been ignoring them without any fear of the likely consequences. He has no fear because he is confident that there will be no consequences. India’s core interests in the region to the south of India have been repeatedly ignored by Rajapaksa.

4.   Our dilemma in Sri Lanka underlines the hard reality that having a strong Navy alone  would not be sufficient to make our core interests prevail in the Indian Ocean region. There has to be a political courage and will to use our naval strength in support of our core interests. In the absence of such courage and will, the ships of our Navy will remain not a powerful arm of the Indian State ready to go into action if our core interests are threatened, but mere oceanic curios, exhibited in public and admired, but not feared.

5.   The negative state of affairs that we are confronted with in Sri Lanka today could be repeated in the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles in the years-if not months– to come if the Indian political leadership is not more assertive in protecting Indian interests in these Island countries.

6.   Fortunately, in the Maldives, the Indian interests still prevail despite an increase in political and economic contacts between China and the Maldives. The Government of Maldives continues to look up to India for strengthening its capacity for meeting threats to  its  security, which presently mostly arise from non-State actors such as Pakistan-based jihadi elements and the Somali pirates. It is still attentive to Indian interests in the area.

7.   So is the case in Seychelles. Despite the Chinese offer of help to Seychelles for strengthening its anti-piracy capabilities, which its has accepted, the Government of Seychelles  continues to be as receptive to Indian offers of assistance and co-operation as it was before.

8.   However, one has reasons to be concerned over recent developments in Mauritius since the visit of President Hu Jintao of China to Port Louis in February,2009. During his visit, China announced a credit at low interest of US $ 260 million to Mauritius to modernize and expand its airport. He said that trade between the two countries  had increased by  11.7 per cent during 2008 to reach US $ 323 million. He also announced  an interest-free loan of US $ 5.9 million and a grant of 30 million yuan ( about US $ 5 million ). Mauritian Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam said that the two countries had discussed possible further assistance to improve transport in and out of the island’s congested capital.

9.   Hu pledged to speed up the construction of the China-funded $730 million Economic and Trade Zone north of the capital. The Tianli project, as it is called, will be the largest single foreign-funded project in Mauritius creating about 40,000 jobs. Between the recognition of China by Mauritius in 1972 and Hu’s visit in February 2009, the total value of the Chinese assistance to Mauritius amounted to US $ 117 million. The fresh assistance extended since then has crossed US $ one billion— an almost ten-fold increase. Thirteen Chinese companies operate in Mauritius in the textiles, construction and IT sectors.

10.   The 521-acre economic and trade  zone  is an important part of what China calls the “going out” policy and its Africa strategy. The objective is to use Mauritius as a platform for servicing its construction and business projects in Southern Africa. The corporate headquarters of Chinese companies  operating in Southern Africa are expected to be located in the new commercial city which China will construct outside  Port Louis under this project. The zone with a modern Chinese-styled city is being built by a consortium consisting of the Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Co., Ltd., the state-controlled Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd and the Taiyuan Iron & Steel Group Co. Ltd. The idea seems to be to convert Mauritius into a Singapore of Southern  Africa to serve China’s Africa strategy. Since Mauritius does not have enough skilled workers to meet the requirements of the Chinese-aided projects, it has allowed China to bring its own nationals to work in these projects. As a result, about 50 per cent of Mauritius’ foreign labour force  could be Chinese. There could be more Chinese than Indians working in Mauritius.

11.   The corporate city being built by the Chinese will compete with the Ebene Cyber City  constructed with Indian assistance. Huawei, the Chinese IT company, reportedly operates from the Cyber City. It provides financial services to Chinese companies in Southern Africa.

12.   Your browser may not support display of this image. Your browser may not support display of this image. Your browser may not support display of this image. ( In an article titled “China makes foray into Mauritius” published on January 25,2010, the “Financial Times” of London wrote: “China’s state-led approach to foreign investment is muscling India aside in its traditional “backyard” by investing $700m in a special economic zone in the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius to service Beijing’s expansion in Africa. Ramakrishna Sithanen, the vice-prime minister of Mauritius and minister of finance, said China was “extremely aggressively” pursuing its objectives in Africa via Mauritius with a wave of strategic investments on the island. He said China’s “different approach”, which forcefully combined business and government interests, was in contrast to India’s more fragmented style that had less backing from the state. So strong was his government’s relationship with Beijing that he said the island had been able to call on the personal intervention of Hu Jintao, China’s president, to sort out problems. China’s participation in Mauritius is a key part of the island’s diversification away from a sugar cane and tourism economy into logistics, information technology and financial services. There are plans to build a logistics and services hub in the economic zone, together with a university and an oceanographic research centre. Mr Sithanen said the Mauritian government had secured China’s consent that the economic zone would not be exclusively for Chinese companies but could be used by others seeking to invest in the region.”

13.   Having seen the gradual erosion of the Indian political influence in Sri Lanka, we are now seeing a similar erosion in Mauritius  It used to be under Indian cultural and economic influence. It continues to be under the Indian cultural influence, but the economic influence is more and more Chinese. As the Chinese economic influence grows, so will its political influence. In protecting one’s core interests, it is the economic and political influence that matters and not the cultural influence.

14. The gradual decline in our political and economic influence in the Indian Ocean region—whether we admit it or not— has been accompanied by a steady increase in the Chinese onshore presence in the countries of this region— mainly for helping these countries in developing their  infrastructure— an airport and an economic and trade city in Mauritius, a commercial port and an international airport in Hambantota in Sri Lanka, expansion and modernization of the Colombo port, road and rail repairs and construction in others parts of Sri Lanka, construction of a new port at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, gas and oil pipelines connecting Kyaukpyu and Yunnan so that gas and oil produced locally and coming by tankers from West Asia and Africa could be moved to Yunnan without having to pass the Malacca Strait and construction of a rapid rail system connecting Rangoon (Yangon) with Yunnan. Talks are on with Bangladesh for Chinese assistance in the modernization of the Chittagong port and for connecting the rail systems of Bangladesh and Myanmar. China is the largest foreign investor in Mynmar today, with the total value of actual and promised investments already touching US $ three billion.

15. For expanding and strengthening its political and economic influence in the Indian Ocean region China has two precious assets which India is not in a position to match now and will not be in a position to match in the foreseeable future—- its vast cash reserves and its vastly superior infrastructure construction skills. There is a hunger for the development of the infrastructure in all these counties. When these countries think of expanding and modernizing their infrastructure, they think of China first and only then of India.

16.       Even the best of Navies with a vast reach in the Indian Ocean region will be only of limited use in the absence of commensurate political and economic influence in the countries of the Ocean region. In building up its onshore presence and influence, China has taken a head-start over India. The Chinese Navy still cannot match and will not be in a position to match the off-shore presence of our Navy in the Indian Ocean area, but  Beijing’s onshore presence and influence will pose increasing challenges to the Indian political leadership and diplomacy.

17. Periodic reports of a speculative nature regarding a Chinese interest in the acquisition of military base —particularly naval—base— facilities in the Indian Ocean region have not been corroborated. The present Chinese interest is in strengthening their economic presence in this area. When the economic presence goes up, political influence automatically goes up. Yes, the Chinese have been developing a robust military supply relationship of a strategic nature with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. One could see the beginnings of such a relationship with Bangladesh too. Do these relationships form part of a well thought-out strategy to acquire a permanent military presence in this area? There is no evidence at present in support of such a suspicion. The Chinese focus is on establishing a strong economic presence and through that a strong political influence. Their willingness to enter into military supply and capacity-building relationships with the countries of this region is a tactical move to strengthen their economic and political influence.

18 The Chinese have been taking care to prevent their growing on-shore influence in this area from being seen as a carefully calculated move to undermine the Indian influence. They project their moves as not inspired by a larger Indian Ocean strategy, but merely as responses to requests for assistance received from the countries of this region. Whether the Chinese  are making calculated moves to undermine the Indian influence or not, the net effect will be an undermining of the Indian influence

19.       The present Chinese focus is on the Pacific. Their efforts are concentrated towards building a strong Pacific presence for their Navy and Air Force so as to be able to counter the US presence and achieve parity with it. Building an equal Indian Ocean presence is not yet part of their short or medium term strategy. They  are not in a position to achieve parity with the Indian Ocean presence of the US and India. I do not visualize a Chinese threat to the naval presence of the US and India in the short and medium terms.

20. Compared to their Pacific naval strategy, there is very little debate in China on the contours of an Indian Ocean strategy. They do not have the required material resources to be able to challenge the prominence presently enjoyed by the US and Indian Navies in the Indian Ocean region. Their interests are presently focused on  protecting the security of their energy supplies and keeping Pakistan propped up as a credible threat to India.

21. The entry of Chinese naval ships on anti-piracy patrols into the Indian Ocean region and the Gulf of Aden has not created any adverse reactions in the region or in the West. The Chinese concerns over the growing threats from the Somali pirates to their ships and crew are accepted by the countries of the region and the West as natural. The regular anti-piracy patrols undertaken by ships of the Chinese Navy in this area ,without causing any regional concerns, have enabled the Chinese Navy to familiarize itself with operating conditions and difficulties in the waters of this region, build up Navy-Navy relationships and  offer Chinese assistance in capacity-building.

22. Should their anti-piracy forays be used as  the initial building block for a long-term Indian Ocean strategy? The Chinese are avoiding any open discussion on this question lest they give rise to unnecessary concerns in the region about Chinese naval assertiveness in the Indian Ocean region as a follow-up to their assertiveness in the Pacific. Occasional voices are heard from the community of retired Chinese naval officers on the need for a naval base in this region to meet the logistics and rest and recreation requirements of their anti-piracy patrols, but such voices have been discouraged by the Government and party leadership to prevent undue concerns. A long-term Chinese naval strategy for the Indian Ocean region is not yet in the making.

23. In working out an Indian strategy for the Indian Ocean region, the political, economic and naval aspects have to receive equal attention. So too the aspect of the Indian and US Navies co-operating with each other to maintain their present primacy in this region. Working out a national Indian Ocean Region strategy should go hand in hand with working out a joint Indo-US strategy to safeguard their interests in the Indian Ocean region.

- B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India
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Building Bridges for Peace and Regional Cooperation - India and it’s East Asian Neighbours - Smt. Sushma Swaraj


Building Bridges for Peace and
Regional Cooperation - India and it’s East Asian Neighbours
- Smt. Sushma Swaraj


1.   Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my contention and belief, that there is no need to build new bridges since they already exist— we have only to rebuild them, mend the damaged parts and restore old links modified by contemporary realities. The foundations of the old bridge are very strong. It is only the architecture of cooperation and progress that needs to be reconstructed and modernised.

2.   There is an erroneous impression that India became interested in its Eastern neighbourhood only as late as ‘90s. It has always figured high in our national priorities though economic and political realities defined the limits of their growth. Under, Pandit Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, India engaged with East Asia under his grand, though somewhat utopian, vision of “Asiatic Federation of Nations”. The Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in 1947 was the earliest attempt by India to engage East Asia. Nehru along with Indonesian President Sukarno took the lead to assert Asian identity which later manifested in the “Bandung Spirit” of 1955.

3.   It is true that India’s Look East Policy acquired a major traction only after 1992. End of the cold war, India liberalizing its economy, revolution in informatics, economic rise of Pacific Rim countries all catalyzed the phenomenon in 1992.

4.   We are on the eve of observing the 20th anniversary of a reorientation in our foreign policy focus. If a precise date has to be set for its formalization we will obviously have to begin with the India ASEAN sectoral dialogue partnership in 1991. In 1994 Prime Minister Narasimha Rao during his visit to Singapore outlined a significant  reorientation of India’s foreign policy when he spoke about “Look East” . Since then the broad contours of a Look East Policy have fallen in place and gradually crystallised. Full dialogue partnership and joining the ASEAN regional Forum in 1996, the start of annual ASEAN India summit meetings in 2002, the conclusion in 2004 of a “partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity” are only some of the milestones and others can also be identified and named.

5.   This policy has had all the characteristics of bipartisanship which is one of the strengths of Indian democracy and the Indian political system when it addresses central issues of national importance. It is in that spirit that I make these remarks and review the past two decades to look ahead about how many of us in India see Southeast Asia, East Asia and the wider world. My approach is not to conduct a post mortem or a pathological examination of these past 20 years. Obviously over that span of time from certain angles the glass will look half empty. From others it will look half full. Whether hall empty or half full is a judgment for historians and specialists to make and it is not my intention to embark on a critique of one or the other actors responsible. My party has also been in power during the 20-year period and as such we are equally liable for a half empty or a half full glass.

6.   The spirit of my remarks, therefore, is in terms of understanding the new structures that have emerged over these past 20 years and what further evolution and structural changes we need to gear ourselves up for in the next decade. The broad coincidence between the end of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the emergence of a period of unipolarity in world politics and  the opening up of the Indian economy and India’s Look East Policy is well known and does not need to be reiterated or elaborated. I will leave it for historians to evaluate in what manner and to what extent 9/11 and the decade of war against terror expedited the erosion of the structures of unipolarity. It is nevertheless clear that over the next decade our Look East Policy and further changes in the Indian economy will take place in an environment which would be in considerable if not complete contrast to a unipolar universe.

7.   A key imperative of Indian foreign policy has been to secure an environment in which we can face upto the central challenges of nation building. This includes addressing the persistence of mass poverty in India, substantially upgrading our administrative delivery systems and infrastructure not just to sustain a high rate of economic growth but also to improve substantially access to education and health services. A continued integration with the world economy is also essential for us to achieve as much as possible in the attainment of these national development goals in as short a time span as possible. At the same time we remain cognizant of both the large size of our country and the fact that its correspondingly large and growing economy is our real strength.

8.   In the context of this foreground let me come to how we see India and Southeast Asia and India and East Asia engage in the future. Next year we will be observing the anniversary of 20 years of the Indo-ASEAN Dialogue Partnership. In this 20-years span trade between India and ASEAN has substantially increased. There have been at the same time purposeful and important initiatives with regard to investment.

9.   We recognise that in the construction of the edifice of the Look East Policy in which our relations with ASEAN are a central pillar, the first brick was laid in Singapore. The conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) in 2005 is the most obvious and visible sign of this engagement. The CECA treaty system has worked well and it has led to similar agreement with Malaysia, Japan etc and that we are at the threshold of a more comprehensive agreement with all the ASEAN countries to expand the FTA in goods which has already been concluded between India and ASEAN to areas of investment and services.

10. The CECA with Singapore followed a Defence Cooperation Agreement which had been concluded earlier. An over view would suggest a broadly similar framework now evolving on the larger canvas as India is now a part of the East Asia Summit process and equally a member of the ADMM+ mechanism. We recognise the importance of growing economic and financial integration proceeding apace with greater understanding and appreciation  of each other’s strategic concerns.

11. A Look East policy or an integrated South East and East Asia Policy necessarily requires a maritime perspective of and from India. In cartographic terms, we need to look at ourselves not as if we are only looking down from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean but rather down from the peninsula towards the Himalayas. Such a cartographic inversion is by no means easy. We cannot disregard our continental compulsions whether on the North West, on the North or in the North East. Nevertheless we have to balance these compulsions with a maritime perspective in which our southern peninsula equally becomes the heart and mind of our foreign policy.  I would like to imagine that this maritime perspective is now embedded in our foreign policy thinking. I will however readily grant the point to a sceptic that it needs to be even more deeply embedded.

12. A maritime perspective necessarily means sea power but I do not imply by this just the need for a strong Navy.  It is rather a web of economic, commercial and political ties with the countries in Southeast Asia and North Asia as the wider pacific community that we have to reach out to. This perspective in fact means also  returning to our roots in ancient maritime history – the Mauryas,  the Chalukyas, the Cholas and other kingdoms and dynasties who were flourishing maritime entities. The erosion of this maritime perspective was a relatively late development from the 17th century onwards. Certainly it was only in the 19th and 20th century that the maritime perspective became entirely a victim of our continental compulsions. It is my view and conviction that in the next decade or two we will see a full flowering of this maritime perspective in India with its attendant scholarship and also retrieving from the annals of history our ancient and historical links with the countries of Southeast Asia and beyond.

13. It has become a truism almost to speak about the shift of power to Asia. I doubt that anyone would seriously question the fact of this seismic shift or that its main driver has been the rapid economic growth in China, and in the tiger economies of southeast Asia and now for the past decade rapid growth in the Indian economy. I would however like to dwell on what is happening within Asia even as this overall shift of economic, political and financial power takes place from the west to the east. Evidently there is a reconfiguration within Asia also underway and we have to see and juxtapose south, southeast, north and northeast Asia.

14. China and India are both ancient civilizations and with developed bodies of thought. Their civilizational interface has been relatively benign through a long history barring the second half of the 20th century. It would be fanciful to make too much of the coincidence that much of this latter period overlaps entirely with the cold war or to hope that with the end of the cold war itself and the beginning of a India China dialogue that the process of change is inevitably going to be unidirectional and positive. From 1989 we have seen a series of moves at stabilising and improving our bilateral relations. Nevertheless China’s rapid economic growth and the consequential growth of its military power, the complexities of its polity and society make for a combination which will require very careful handling and consideration. This is not just for India but perhaps for all its neighbours and all powers that interface with China.  In the case of the India China interface the problem is more complex since that interface comprises both a very direct maritime and also continental dimension. Notwithstanding our benign engagement over the centuries, the second half of the 20th century casts a very long shadow. However, what one also discerns are positive possibilities that emerge from the maritime interface, in its widest possible sense- economic, political, cultural and religious, between India and China as these offer grounds for deepening and strengthening our bilateral relations. This process will reduce the relative weightage of the considerable intractability of our continental interface. The fact that we are together in important groupings such as the East Asia Summit or the ADMM+ mechanisms is itself a very important positive development. In this perspective a continued expansion of the China India economic relationship and expansion in cultural, scholarly and people to people ties along with a candid political relationship are necessary for difficulties can reasonably be expected from time to time.

15. I had the occasion to engage with US Secretary of State Mrs Hillary Clinton during her visit to my country in June this year. During our extensive discussions at my residence, we talked about India’s emerging role in the Asia and the focus naturally turned towards East and South East Asia. Emphasising that it was the Bharatiya Janata Party that reshaped India’s foreign policy priorities during its rule under the leadership of Shri Atal Bihari Bihari Vajpayee, I said the time had now come not only to “Look East” but “Act East”. It was most heartening to find the US Secterary of State incorporate many of the points we discussed in the course of her public lecture in Chennai a couple of days later. In fact, Mrs Clinton articulated the issues so succinctly and powerfully that I believe it merits to be recalled in the context of today’s lecture.

16. This is what Mrs Clinton had to say, and I quote: “There are big questions for us to consider. Will this region adopt basic rules of the road or rules of the sea to mobilise strategic and economic cooperation and manage disagreements? Will it build the regional architecture of institutions and arrangements to enforce international norms on security, trade, rule of law, human rights, and accountable governance? Through its Look East policy, India is poised to help lead toward the answers to these questions.”

      “Ultimately, if we want to address, manage, or solve some of the most pressing issues of the 21st century, India, China, and the United States will have to coordinate our efforts.

      In all of these areas, India’s leadership will help to shape positively the future of the Asia Pacific. That’s why the United States supports India’s Look East policy, and we encourage India not just to Look East, but to Engage East and Act East as well.”

17. Now coming to North East Asia, my contention is that with Japan and South Korea- we envisage a future in which India’s young labour force, large market offer major opportunities for investment. The future then is to construct a financial and investment corridor between North East and South Asia. The long term logic to this has been discernible for some time; however the tragic Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan have catalysed this process further. The challenge for India is to construct legal and financial regimes to provide a more enabling environment to encourage investment from Japan and Korea in manufacturing in India.

18. In both these sets of relationships a vital role will be played by ASEAN: First as a bridge and a fulcrum between South Asia and North and North East Asia. Secondly, and equally importantly, as a political and economic association of over 500 Million people with strong cultural and historical links with India.

19. I mentioned earlier that it is a truism now to speak of a shift of power to Asia. But the history of power and of the diplomacy behind shifts of power caution us that conflict and power go together. The shift of power to Europe in the 19th and 20th century saw Europe torn apart by forces its political system could not either comprehend or accommodate. We need to take these cautionary principles seriously as we address issues of regional and trans-regional architectures. I say this because we are situated in societies which are witnessing social and economic change of a magnitude that is truly unprecedented. Compressed in the space of a generation we have seen change which unfolded over twice or thrice that time span in Europe in the 19th century.

20. How we address this change internally in our countries will determine the externalities of Asia in the next 20 to 30 years. Our environment will, therefore, be one in which there are two major forces at play: A global shift of greater economic, political and military power to Asia; and societies undergoing tremendous internal social change. We need to recognize this frontally and see how we equip ourselves to address the issues that arise. There are of course efforts underway in this direction. It is for good reason that the term regional architecture has become part of our daily lexicon. The East Asia Summit Process and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ forum being expanded to include 6 other countries are major institutional and political initiatives which we support. Nevertheless these architectures are constructed by diplomats and we should therefore recognise not just their great utility but also their limitations. 

21. In India in the past 20 years we have seen major changes in the fabric of our society and societal values. As a political figure I eat, live and breathe this change daily and therefore can intuitively understand it. It is in this context that I feel that the diplomatic and political institutions must be further strengthened by consciously embedding in them greater people to people interaction. That is the best safeguard we will have to the prevention of conflict and mis-understandings. People to people interaction are more than tourism. If that is so then it would be fair to say that such exchanges have lagged behind the economic and financial integration that has taken place between India and East Asia. Even at an intellectual level knowledge in India about South East Asia is limited. Perhaps it is the same in South East Asia about India. These gaps need to be addressed in educational curricula and institutions. There must be more exchanges between students and teachers. A lesson we must learn from post war Europe is that people level exchanges are the best foundation for any diplomatic architecture. I believe that this should be applied as an integral part of the East Asia Summit process and the earlier we do so the better it would be for all the constituent countries.

22. I will conclude with two points which I feel have a special place in the India South East Asia interface. Myanmar and the North Eastern States of India are together the bridge between South and South East Asia. That bridge needs special focus and concerted attention. It is a vital strategic lynchpin which can transform our economies. India and ASEAN together have the means and the capacities to face up to this challenge. We must find the political will to do so. 2012 is a special year in the history of the ASEAN India interface. It will provide a suitable platform to bring this bridge to the centre of our radars.

23. India and ASEAN if seen as independent entities are giant conglomerations of people. Yet looking only at the overall entity can obscure or blur important facets of both entities. Within ASEAN as within India different regions are at different stages of development and may have special priorities. Trade, financial flows and investment inevitably will have a centre space in our interaction. But in this process we do need also to keep the requirements of our North Eastern States as indeed of Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Here the scope of project cooperation is immense as we can harness our larger complementarities in areas of skills development, tourism and other services . I do hope that this aspect is kept in view by all the Governments concerned and initiatives such as the Ganga Mekong Cooperation are continuously strengthened.      

24. Ladies and Gentlemen, in our Parliament I represent  Vidisha a constituency named after an ancient town which is its headquarters. Vidisha has been for at least 2500 years in the midst of trunk routes through which trade, ideas and people moved between India and West and East Asia. In the second century BC a Greek Ambassador by name Heliodorus to the Monarch in Vidisha raised a column to propitiate the God Vishnu. This column still stands and reminds us that cross cultural interactions and fusion is by no means a preserve only of our age.  Not far from Vidisha town is the very important historical site of Sanchi where the Emperor Ashoka commissioned work on a great Stupa which still stands.

Finally I cannot therefore but end with reflecting on the ancient ties between India and South East Asia: Our heritage is shared to a far greater extant than is now generally known and we must encourage greater scholarly attention on that history. Again 2012 as a commemorative year is the platform to launch such studies. We need only to reflect on the name of Singapore to evoke that past- as indeed think of names such as Champa, SriVijaya, Nalanda, and so on. The study of the past is not just an academic indulgence but in fact a vital component of the entire enterprise to construct architecture of cooperation and progress between India and South East Asia. 

- Text of Public Lecture  by Mrs Sushma Swaraj ,
Hon’ble Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha , India ,
on 14 September 2011 at Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore

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