Global
Geopolitics & Political Economy
- B.
Raman
(Based
on a talk delivered at a seminar on the Indian Ocean at Bangalore on February
26,2010. It was jointly organized by the Asia Centre, Bangalore, and the Indian
Council of World Affairs, New Delhi )
The
main security threats to Indian interests in the Indian Ocean area arise from
three factors—firstly, the gradual erosion of the Indian political influence in
the area; secondly, the increase in the Chinese presence in the area; and
thirdly, the uncontrolled activities of the Somali pirates.
2. Nowhere is the
erosion of the Indian political influence more evident than in Sri Lanka where
despite our assistance to the Government of Sri Lanka in its successful
counter-insurgency operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) we have not been able to protect either the interests of the Sri Lankan
Tamils or the lives and livelihood of Indian Tamil fishermen, who have been
repeatedly at the mercy of the Sri Lankan Navy.
3. Our repeated
pleas for finding an early political solution to the grievances of the Sri
Lankan Tamils and for stopping attacks—some of them brutal and fatal— on Indian
Tamil fishermen have had no impact on the Government of President Mahinda
Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa, while pretending to be sensitive to Indian interests, has
been ignoring them without any fear of the likely consequences. He has no fear
because he is confident that there will be no consequences. India’s core
interests in the region to the south of India have been repeatedly ignored by
Rajapaksa.
4. Our dilemma in
Sri Lanka underlines the hard reality that having a strong Navy alone
would not be sufficient to make our core interests prevail in the Indian Ocean
region. There has to be a political courage and will to use our naval strength
in support of our core interests. In the absence of such courage and will, the
ships of our Navy will remain not a powerful arm of the Indian State ready to
go into action if our core interests are threatened, but mere oceanic curios,
exhibited in public and admired, but not feared.
5. The negative
state of affairs that we are confronted with in Sri Lanka today could be
repeated in the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles in the years-if not months–
to come if the Indian political leadership is not more assertive in protecting
Indian interests in these Island countries.
6. Fortunately, in
the Maldives, the Indian interests still prevail despite an increase in
political and economic contacts between China and the Maldives. The Government
of Maldives continues to look up to India for strengthening its capacity for
meeting threats to its security, which presently mostly arise from
non-State actors such as Pakistan-based jihadi elements and the Somali pirates.
It is still attentive to Indian interests in the area.
7. So is the case
in Seychelles. Despite the Chinese offer of help to Seychelles for
strengthening its anti-piracy capabilities, which its has accepted, the
Government of Seychelles continues to be as receptive to Indian offers of
assistance and co-operation as it was before.
8. However, one
has reasons to be concerned over recent developments in Mauritius since the
visit of President Hu Jintao of China to Port Louis in February,2009. During
his visit, China announced a credit at low interest of US $ 260 million to
Mauritius to modernize and expand its airport. He said that trade between the
two countries had increased by 11.7 per cent during 2008 to reach
US $ 323 million. He also announced an interest-free loan of US $ 5.9
million and a grant of 30 million yuan ( about US $ 5 million ). Mauritian
Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam said that the two countries had discussed
possible further assistance to improve transport in and out of the island’s
congested capital.
9. Hu pledged to
speed up the construction of the China-funded $730 million Economic and Trade
Zone north of the capital. The Tianli project, as it is called, will be the
largest single foreign-funded project in Mauritius creating about 40,000 jobs.
Between the recognition of China by Mauritius in 1972 and Hu’s visit in
February 2009, the total value of the Chinese assistance to Mauritius amounted
to US $ 117 million. The fresh assistance extended since then has crossed US $
one billion— an almost ten-fold increase. Thirteen Chinese companies operate in
Mauritius in the textiles, construction and IT sectors.
10. The
521-acre economic and trade zone is an important part of what China
calls the “going out” policy and its Africa strategy. The objective is to use Mauritius
as a platform for servicing its construction and business projects in Southern
Africa. The corporate headquarters of Chinese companies operating in
Southern Africa are expected to be located in the new commercial city which
China will construct outside Port Louis under this project. The zone with
a modern Chinese-styled city is being built by a consortium consisting of the
Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Co., Ltd., the state-controlled Shanxi Coking Coal
Group Co. Ltd and the Taiyuan Iron & Steel Group Co. Ltd. The idea seems to
be to convert Mauritius into a Singapore of Southern Africa to serve
China’s Africa strategy. Since Mauritius does not have enough skilled workers
to meet the requirements of the Chinese-aided projects, it has allowed China to
bring its own nationals to work in these projects. As a result, about 50 per
cent of Mauritius’ foreign labour force could be Chinese. There could be
more Chinese than Indians working in Mauritius.
11. The
corporate city being built by the Chinese will compete with the Ebene Cyber
City constructed with Indian assistance. Huawei, the Chinese IT company,
reportedly operates from the Cyber City. It provides financial services to
Chinese companies in Southern Africa.
12. Your
browser may not support display of this image. Your browser may not support
display of this image. Your browser may not support display of this image. ( In
an article titled “China makes foray into Mauritius” published on January
25,2010, the “Financial Times” of London wrote: “China’s state-led approach to
foreign investment is muscling India aside in its traditional “backyard” by
investing $700m in a special economic zone in the Indian Ocean island of
Mauritius to service Beijing’s expansion in Africa. Ramakrishna Sithanen, the
vice-prime minister of Mauritius and minister of finance, said China was
“extremely aggressively” pursuing its objectives in Africa via Mauritius with a
wave of strategic investments on the island. He said China’s “different
approach”, which forcefully combined business and government interests, was in
contrast to India’s more fragmented style that had less backing from the state.
So strong was his government’s relationship with Beijing that he said the
island had been able to call on the personal intervention of Hu Jintao, China’s
president, to sort out problems. China’s participation in Mauritius is a key
part of the island’s diversification away from a sugar cane and tourism economy
into logistics, information technology and financial services. There are plans
to build a logistics and services hub in the economic zone, together with a
university and an oceanographic research centre. Mr Sithanen said the Mauritian
government had secured China’s consent that the economic zone would not be
exclusively for Chinese companies but could be used by others seeking to invest
in the region.”
13. Having
seen the gradual erosion of the Indian political influence in Sri Lanka, we are
now seeing a similar erosion in Mauritius It used to be under Indian
cultural and economic influence. It continues to be under the Indian cultural
influence, but the economic influence is more and more Chinese. As the Chinese economic influence grows, so will its
political influence. In protecting one’s core interests, it is the economic and
political influence that matters and not the cultural influence.
14. The gradual
decline in our political and economic influence in the Indian Ocean
region—whether we admit it or not— has been accompanied by a steady increase in
the Chinese onshore presence in the countries of this region— mainly for
helping these countries in developing their infrastructure— an airport
and an economic and trade city in Mauritius, a commercial port and an
international airport in Hambantota in Sri Lanka, expansion and modernization
of the Colombo port, road and rail repairs and construction in others parts of
Sri Lanka, construction of a new port at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, gas and oil
pipelines connecting Kyaukpyu and Yunnan so that gas and oil produced locally
and coming by tankers from West Asia and Africa could be moved to Yunnan
without having to pass the Malacca Strait and construction of a rapid rail
system connecting Rangoon (Yangon) with Yunnan. Talks are on with Bangladesh
for Chinese assistance in the modernization of the Chittagong port and for
connecting the rail systems of Bangladesh and Myanmar. China is the largest
foreign investor in Mynmar today, with the total value of actual and promised
investments already touching US $ three billion.
15. For expanding and strengthening its political and
economic influence in the Indian Ocean region China has two precious assets
which India is not in a position to match now and will not be in a position to
match in the foreseeable future—- its vast cash reserves and its vastly superior
infrastructure construction skills. There is a hunger for the development of
the infrastructure in all these counties. When these countries think of
expanding and modernizing their infrastructure, they think of China first and
only then of India.
16. Even the
best of Navies with a vast reach in the Indian Ocean region will be only of
limited use in the absence of commensurate political and economic influence in
the countries of the Ocean region. In building up its onshore presence and
influence, China has taken a head-start over India. The Chinese Navy still
cannot match and will not be in a position to match the off-shore presence of
our Navy in the Indian Ocean area, but Beijing’s onshore presence and
influence will pose increasing challenges to the Indian political leadership
and diplomacy.
17. Periodic reports
of a speculative nature regarding a Chinese interest in the acquisition of
military base —particularly naval—base— facilities in the Indian Ocean region
have not been corroborated. The present Chinese interest is in strengthening
their economic presence in this area. When the economic presence goes up,
political influence automatically goes up. Yes, the Chinese have been
developing a robust military supply relationship of a strategic nature with Pakistan,
Sri Lanka and Myanmar. One could see the beginnings of such a relationship with
Bangladesh too. Do these relationships form part of a well thought-out strategy
to acquire a permanent military presence in this area? There is no evidence at
present in support of such a suspicion. The Chinese focus is on establishing a
strong economic presence and through that a strong political influence. Their
willingness to enter into military supply and capacity-building relationships
with the countries of this region is a tactical move to strengthen their
economic and political influence.
18 The Chinese have
been taking care to prevent their growing on-shore influence in this area from
being seen as a carefully calculated move to undermine the Indian influence. They
project their moves as not inspired by a larger Indian Ocean strategy, but
merely as responses to requests for assistance received from the countries of
this region. Whether the Chinese are making calculated moves to undermine
the Indian influence or not, the net effect will be an undermining of the
Indian influence
19. The
present Chinese focus is on the Pacific. Their efforts are concentrated towards
building a strong Pacific presence for their Navy and Air Force so as to be
able to counter the US presence and achieve parity with it. Building an equal
Indian Ocean presence is not yet part of their short or medium term strategy.
They are not in a position to achieve parity with the Indian Ocean
presence of the US and India. I do not visualize a Chinese threat to the naval
presence of the US and India in the short and medium terms.
20. Compared to
their Pacific naval strategy, there is very little debate in China on the
contours of an Indian Ocean strategy. They
do not have the required material resources to be able to challenge the
prominence presently enjoyed by the US and Indian Navies in the Indian Ocean
region. Their interests are presently focused on protecting the security
of their energy supplies and keeping Pakistan propped up as a credible threat
to India.
21. The entry of
Chinese naval ships on anti-piracy patrols into the Indian Ocean region and the
Gulf of Aden has not created any adverse reactions in the region or in the
West. The Chinese concerns over the growing threats from the Somali pirates to
their ships and crew are accepted by the countries of the region and the West
as natural. The regular anti-piracy patrols undertaken by ships of the Chinese
Navy in this area ,without causing any regional concerns, have enabled the
Chinese Navy to familiarize itself with operating conditions and difficulties in the waters of this region,
build up Navy-Navy relationships and offer Chinese assistance in
capacity-building.
22. Should their
anti-piracy forays be used as the initial building block for a long-term
Indian Ocean strategy? The Chinese are avoiding any open discussion on this
question lest they give rise to unnecessary concerns in the region about
Chinese naval assertiveness in the Indian Ocean region as a follow-up to their
assertiveness in the Pacific. Occasional voices are heard from the community of
retired Chinese naval officers on the need for a naval base in this region to
meet the logistics and rest and recreation requirements of their anti-piracy
patrols, but such voices have been discouraged by the Government and party
leadership to prevent undue concerns. A long-term Chinese naval strategy for
the Indian Ocean region is not yet in the making.
23. In working out
an Indian strategy for the Indian Ocean region, the political, economic and
naval aspects have to receive equal attention. So too the aspect of the Indian
and US Navies co-operating with each other to maintain their present primacy in
this region. Working out a national Indian Ocean Region strategy should go hand
in hand with working out a joint Indo-US strategy to safeguard their interests
in the Indian Ocean region.
- B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India
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