Monday 30 January 2012

Northern frontiers of India : Strategic Importance of POK



In the name of development, massive efforts are taking place to change the geo-political scenario at high mountains of Himalayan region. Pakistan is playing a major role here because it has an illegal possession on northern frontiers of Indian soil. Chinese also have their interests in this land. Both the countries join hands to exploit this haven on the earth, and made the life of the people living here like the hell.  

Among the major development projects in Pakistan in which the Chinese have been involved till now are the construction of an international commercial port cum naval base in Gwadar on the Makran coast in Balochistan and the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway connecting the Xinjiang province of China with Pakistan via the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) in the North-West Frontier Province.

The Pakistanis, since the days of General Pervez Musharraf have repeatedly sought Chinese assistance for the construction of a petrochemical complex at Gwadar and oil and gas pipelines and a railway line connecting Gwadar with the Xinjiang province.  The Chinese interest in participating in development projects in Pakistan is presently confined to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir including the Northern Areas. 

The Karakoram Highway was originally constructed with Chinese assistance with the participation of Chinese engineers. For the last 10 years it has been in a bad state of repairs due to poor maintenance by Pakistani engineers. The signing of an MOU for the construction of a dam at Bunji in the Astore district of the Northern Areas by officials of Pakistan's Ministry of Water and Power and China's Three Gorges Project Corporation. The dam, one of the eight hydel projects short-listed for construction will have a capacity of generating 7,000 megawatts of electricity.

Zardari attended a presentation on small and medium sized dams, water conservation and irrigation by the Zhejiang Design Institute of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power. Li Yueming, the president of the institute, said they had carried out feasibility studies of a couple of medium-sized dams in PoK. Shakeel Durrani, chairman of the WAPDA, who was present on the occasion, said that Chinese companies were already working on a number of hydel projects in Pakistan, including Neelum-Jhelum and Gomal Zam and the raising of the height of the Mangla dam in PoK. He said the institute would be invited to bid for the construction of 12 small dams.

The State was partitioned after the war between India and Pakistan and puppet rulers of Pakistani Administered Kashmir signed away vast areas of Gilgit Baltistan to their political bosses in Islamabad; and limited their interest to the area known as Azad Kashmir. Since 1947 bureaucrats and secret agencies of Pakistan ruled Gilgit-Baltistan with an iron fist.

The party (Muslim Conference) that signed that ignominious treaty with Pakistani rulers had no branches or even a single member in the areas of Gilgit Baltistan. One wonders what moral or legal justification they had to sign that treaty and leave the people of 28 thousand Square miles at the mercy of oppressive and imperialist minded bureaucrats of Pakistan.
 
After signing this agreement, Muslim Conference leaders and rulers of Azad Kashmir almost forgot about the plight of the people of Gilgit Baltistan; and confined their rule and interest to the territory of Azad Kashmir. 

For the first time in the past 63 years, rulers of Pakistani Administered Kashmir were allowed to visit Gilgit Baltistan. When there was some ambiguity regarding the legal status of these areas, Islamabad did not allow any ruler of Azad Kashmir to visit Gilgit Baltistan. In September 2009, Pakistan unilaterally and against bilateral and international covenants on Kashmir changed legal status of these areas and drastically made them a province of Pakistan. So, as far as Islamabad was concerned they have allowed the Prime Minister and the President of Azad Kashmir to visit a 'Pakistani province'.

The question is how do people of Jammu and Kashmir and All Parties Hurriyet Conference, who claim to represent all the Kashmiris think of this? Are they too frightened to speak about Gilgit Baltistan because their political masters in Islamabad could get angry? In any case, the leadership of APHC have myopic view of the struggle and want to see everything with the lenses of religion and their influence is restricted to some sub districts of the Valley.

In this rooftop of the world, as many as 33 peaks rise 24,000 feet, the borders of five countries lie in close proximity-Pakistan, China, India, Russia and Afghanistan. India is concerned about vast logistical network developed by China impinging on the country's security in the western sector through Aksai Chin and PoK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir). As there is no comparable road network anywhere else in the world with such a high degree of military importance, it is not surprising that thousands of Chinese and Pakistani troops are engaged more or less permanently on either side of the Karakoram to maintain it. China is in control of a portion of erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir.

The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act 1974 oblige all leaders from the President down and all legislators to swear loyalty to the cause of accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan." Islam is the State religion (Article 3). The President and Prime Minister must be Muslim. The right of freedom of association is restricted. Article 7(2) says: No person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of the State's accession to Pakistan.

If one go through the documents, the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) adopted a resolution embodying its proposals for a settlement. On December 11,1948 the UNCIP offered proposals in amplification of the first to provide for a plebiscite. Both sides accepted it. They were formally embodied in its resolution of January 5 1949.

According it, while the tribesmen from Pakistan and Pakistan's troops were to be withdrawn completely, India was to withdraw only the bulk of its forces retaining some "to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order". Accordingly the resolution provided that the government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will safeguard law and order and that human and political right will be respected. This is clear recognition of the legality of Kashmir's accession to India, India's external sovereignty over the State and the legal authority of the Government of the State. Though, the exercise was meaningless because Pakistan refused to withdraw its forces from the occupied territory.

In utter disregard of the UN resolutions by which it swears, Pakistan imposed a new regime on POK on June 21 1952. Rules of Business were presented on October 28. Rule 5 said: The President of Azad Kashmir Government shall hold office during the pleasure of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference duly recognized as such by the Government of Pakistan in the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.

POK is firmly riveted to Pakistan's control through the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council. It is presided over by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and comprises his five nominees and The President and Prime Minister of POK with six representatives of the POK Assembly elected by proportional representation. In December 1993 the blasphemy laws of Pakistan were extended to the POK. The northern parts of the State have been dismembered from the POK and their status as part of the state questioned. They are ruled directly through a chief executive, appointed by Islamabad with a 26-member Northern Areas Council. The people have never seen elections or enjoyed human rights.

The State's accession to India has never been challenged by the UN Commission for India and Pakistan or the Security Council. As early as 4 February, 1948, the US Representative in the Security Council declared: "External sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir is no longer under the control of the Maharaja. With the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, this foreign sovereignty went over to India and is exercised by India and that is how India happens to be here as a petitioner."

Similarly, the representative of the USSR said at the 765th meeting of the Security Council: "The question of Kashmir has been settled by the people of Kashmir themselves. They decided that Kashmir is an integral part of the Republic of India."

The legal adviser to the UN Commission came to the conclusion that the State's accession was legal and could not be questioned. This fact was further recognized by the UN Commission in its report submitted to the UN in defining its resolutions of 13 August, 1948, and 5 January, 1949. Both these resolutions were accepted by India and Pakistan.

The UN Commission resolutions have become obsolete. This view was expressed by the UN Commission itself as far back as 1949, and has been reiterated by Dr. Jarring and Dr. Graham, both UN representatives. Passage of time, change of circumstances, and Pakistan's repeated and continuing violations, have ruled out all possibility of implementing them.

Pakistan tried to impose a military solution by launching a war against India in 1965. The pattern was familiar. Massive infiltration was followed by invasion of Indian Territory on September 1, 1965.

After the war, bilateral talks were held in June/July 1972. Under the terms of this Agreement, the two countries undertook to resolve all differences bilaterally. Pakistan, through its commitment in the Agreement agreed to shift once for all the entire Kashmir question from the UN to the bilateral plane.

Gilgit and Baltistan of Pok are gateway to central Asia for India and southeastern countries similarly it is gateway for central Asian countries to India, South east Asia  and China. Basically it is a strategic junction full with natural resources. Demography of POK has been systematically changed over past 6 decades with more of punjabis residing there along with retired Pakistan Army personnel’s.

The dignity of the Indian state would never allow it to compromise with any dilution of its integrity. India has kept the doors open to a dialogue with Pakistan, despite the latter's obduracy. But the offer of a dialogue should not in any way lead Pakistan into believing that India and its people do not have the innate strength and resilience to confront any territorial ambitions that Pakistan may nurture in Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan ought to realize that the contours of a solution after six decades will necessarily be different than those that were envisaged in 1948-49 given Pakistan's concept of selective self-determination. Neither plebiscite nor independence can now be contemplated. It is not beyond the wit of man to devise a solution which satisfies the aspirations of the people within the Indian Union, and redresses the wrongs, if any, they have suffered.

Courtesy : Jammu - Kashmir Study Centre, New Delhi

Thursday 26 January 2012

Pak daydream, wake-up call

 Shekhar Gupta

There is a phenomenon peculiar to the Pakistani Establishment, that unique combination of its army, intelligence agencies and bureaucracy that constitutes its permanent government, and therefore spelt with a capital “E”. Every 10 or 12 years, it starts believing that it is winning. Winning what, how and to what effect, are not facts it wants to be confused with. It just believes, at that particular moment, that it is “winning” against India. This is when the foundation of an impending disaster is laid. Unfortunately, if you’ve been exasperated at the sudden turn in the Pakistani Establishment’s conduct, you have to understand that they are currently caught in the throes of another such irrational euphoria. They again think they are “winning”.

The first phase of madness was 1947-48, that led to the invasion of Kashmir and ruined our relationship at the very start. The next came along with our war with China which, they thought, was a wonderful time again to seize Kashmir, through negotiated, US/UK-backed blackmail (India was desperately seeking American military aid then) and, when that failed, through war against a recently “defeated” army. That led to the misadventure of 1965. That moment of madness came yet again in 1971, when they misread the significance of their emergence as the link between Nixon’s America and China to mean that they had a superpower shield and could crush the revolt in their eastern half as brutally as they wished. They lost half of Pakistan.


Then, almost exactly 12 years later they saw another “wonderful” opportunity in India’s Punjab, with rising Sikh militancy. This was just the moment to wage a war of a thousand cuts they were perfecting along with the Americans in Afghanistan. That phase of belligerence was put down only after the reality check of the Operation Brasstacks standoff in 1987. But check the IMF/ World Bank figures of annual economic growth. It is around this time that Pakistan permanently lost the sizeable edge it had maintained against India in terms of economic growth. In 1993, again, came the next moment of the same “we are winning” illusion, because of troubles in our Kashmir and the victory of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. A full-fledged “jehad” was launched in Kashmir, the consequences of which we are all facing till today. I would treat Kargil and the Kandahar hijack as part of the same continuing madness and it was all cut short by 9/11. Almost a decade after Kargil now, you see the same Establishment believe that they are “winning”. Our challenge, therefore, is to assess what is causing this “winning” feeling in Islamabad/ Pindi and what disaster, for Pakistan, and collaterally for us, this could lead to.

If you want to put a date to the beginning of this new mood, it would perhaps be Obama’s West Point address when he nearly set a deadline for the US withdrawal. The Pakistani GHQ read it as American acceptance of the unwinnability of the Afghan war. This was the window of critical relevance they were looking for. This lifted for them the shadow of 26/11. If Obama wanted to leave any time next year, it could only be after striking some kind of a deal with a faction of the Taliban. Only Pakistan could bring about that deal, and also guarantee the future conduct of the new regime. In one stroke then, this will give Pakistan a diplomatic indispensability to the Americans while they are here, and strategic depth once they are gone. That new position could then be leveraged by demanding a settlement of basic, “root-causes” issues with India, sidelining the problem of the India-specific Lashkars. The new turn in the Pakistani Establishment, the Kayani speech, the water non-paper and the sudden and brazen re-surfacing of Hafiz Saeed are to be fully understood in this context.


To be fair, most civilian politicians in Pakistan do not share this illusion, but at this point they count for nothing. Similarly the civil society, the free, moderate and modern sections of the media would be seriously concerned by this. But Pakistan’s political class and civil society have been greatly undermined in the past year, and some of the blame for that lies at the doors of its feuding president and prime minister. When policy is left to a tiny soldier-spook cabal, you get the kind of disaster that has followed each such moment in the subcontinent’s history. Pakistan’s larger tragedy, in fact, is that its strategy has often been crafted by purely tactical minds. That is not how great nations function: their strategy is devised by strategists and implemented by tacticians. But that is a problem the people of Pakistan and its civil society will solve, though in the course of time.

So how should we deal with this new situation? First of all, keep engaging with Pakistan. It is a process that would have been much more effective had it been resumed three months earlier, but still, build on that first meeting. Second, look for where your leverage lies in the region’s new reality. This entire new daydream is predicated upon the Americans being able to fight with some degree of effectiveness for another year or so, so they could find a faction of the Taliban willing to settle. Obama cannot leave Afghanistan as Nixon had fled Vietnam. To fight effectively, he needs every platoon of the forces the Pakistanis had re-deployed to the west from their classical eastern, India-facing posture. This has also been made possible by some Indian cooperation. For example, if India had moved even one division towards the border after 26/11, this entire game would have been upset. India now has to let the Americans and the British know that if there is another major terror attack, it may just be constrained to return to its traditional counter-terror gambit, of threatening Pakistan with a conventional response. Just a division, a few squadrons of multi-role aircraft moved westwards would have the Pakistanis rolling back all the divisions from their west to the east. This is the last thing Obama wants, and this is our most important leverage. He cannot be allowed to take our vital interests for granted.

Of course, this has to be accompanied by one more correction: the end of the six-year complacence on modernising our conventional defence. While it is fashionable to credit nuclear weapons with ensuring peace in the region, the fact is, it was the deterrence of a swift and withering conventional response that kept the Pakistani adventurists in check since 1987. In the past six years that edge has been allowed to erode, and when Manmohan Singh looks back he will be honest enough to acknowledge that as his government’s biggest failure on national security. What kind of country living in such a dangerous neighbourhood returns Rs 10,000 crore of its defence acquisition budget unspent? If Manmohan Singh can simply start fixing that and also let the Americans know that another 26/11 may, just may, see a different response from us, it would be a fine strategic response to this new challenge. It may even ensure peace in the region.


sg@expressindia.com

 http://www.indianexpress.com/news/pak-daydream-wakeup-call/593317/0

PAK DAYDREAM - WAKE UP CALL




Shekhar Gupta writes on Pakistan: When policy is left to a tiny soldier-spook cabal, you get the kind of disaster that has followed each such moment in the subcontinent’s history. Pakistan’s larger tragedy, in fact, is that its strategy has often been crafted by purely tactical minds (read Military) . That is not how great nations function: their strategy is devised by strategists and implemented by tacticians.

On Water: The new turn in the Pakistani Establishment, the Kayani speech, the water non-paper and the sudden and brazen re-surfacing of Hafiz Saeed (exhorting Pak military line that India is drying up Pakistan by witholding water) are to be fully understood in this context.

Shekhar Gupta writing elsewhere states if Pakistan were to take over Kashmir, they will not be able to give an extra ounce of water more than what India is sharing with it today. Primary cause is that Punjab region is Pakistan is using up the lion's share of water coming in from Kashmir and they are not distributing it to its other provinces. Blaming India suits its purpose but cant blind the people of Pakistan for long.



Look at this map - the importance of Kashmir, its dams and waters become important. If India were to truly turn the tap off, Pakistan will become a desert
as Hamid Gul predicted.

THE FULL ORIGINAL ARTICLE (c) SHEKHAR GUPTA - INDIAN EXPRESS:

There is a phenomenon peculiar to the Pakistani Establishment, that unique combination of its army, intelligence agencies and bureaucracy that constitutes its permanent government, and therefore spelt with a capital “E”. Every 10 or 12 years, it starts believing that it is winning. Winning what, how and to what effect, are not facts it wants to be confused with. It just believes, at that particular moment, that it is “winning” against India. This is when the foundation of an impending disaster is laid. Unfortunately, if you’ve been exasperated at the sudden turn in the Pakistani Establishment’s conduct, you have to understand that they are currently caught in the throes of another such irrational euphoria. They again think they are “winning”.

The first phase of madness was 1947-48, that led to the invasion of Kashmir and ruined our relationship at the very start. The next came along with our war with China which, they thought, was a wonderful time again to seize Kashmir, through negotiated, US/UK-backed blackmail (India was desperately seeking American military aid then) and, when that failed, through war against a recently “defeated” army. That led to the misadventure of 1965. That moment of madness came yet again in 1971, when they misread the significance of their emergence as the link between Nixon’s America and China to mean that they had a superpower shield and could crush the revolt in their eastern half as brutally as they wished. They lost half of Pakistan.


Then, almost exactly 12 years later they saw another “wonderful” opportunity in India’s Punjab, with rising Sikh militancy. This was just the moment to wage a war of a thousand cuts they were perfecting along with the Americans in Afghanistan. That phase of belligerence was put down only after the reality check of the Operation Brasstacks standoff in 1987. But check the IMF/ World Bank figures of annual economic growth. It is around this time that Pakistan permanently lost the sizeable edge it had maintained against India in terms of economic growth. In 1993, again, came the next moment of the same “we are winning” illusion, because of troubles in our Kashmir and the victory of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. A full-fledged

“Jehad” was launched in Kashmir, the consequences of which we are all facing till today. I would treat Kargil and the Kandahar hijack as part of the same continuing madness and it was all cut short by 9/11. Almost a decade after Kargil now, you see the same Establishment believe that they are “winning”. Our challenge, therefore, is to assess what is causing this “winning” feeling in Islamabad/ Pindi and what disaster, for Pakistan, and collaterally for us, this could lead to.

If you want to put a date to the beginning of this new mood, it would perhaps be Obama’s West Point address when he nearly set a deadline for the US withdrawal. The Pakistani GHQ read it as American acceptance of the unwinnability of the Afghan war. This was the window of critical relevance they were looking for. This lifted for them the shadow of 26/11. If Obama wanted to leave any time next year, it could only be after striking some kind of a deal with a faction of the Taliban. Only Pakistan could bring about that deal, and also guarantee the future conduct of the new regime. In one stroke then, this will give Pakistan a diplomatic indispensability to the Americans while they are here, and strategic depth once they are gone. That new position could then be leveraged by demanding a settlement of basic, “root-causes” issues with India, sidelining the problem of the India-specific Lashkars. The new turn in the Pakistani Establishment, the Kayani speech, the water non-paper and the sudden and brazen re-surfacing of Hafiz Saeed are to be fully understood in this context.

To be fair, most civilian politicians in Pakistan do not share this illusion, but at this point they count for nothing. Similarly the civil society, the free, moderate and modern sections of the media would be seriously concerned by this. But Pakistan’s political class and civil society have been greatly undermined in the past year, and some of the blame for that lies at the doors of its feuding president and prime minister. When policy is left to a tiny soldier-spook cabal, you get the kind of disaster that has followed each such moment in the subcontinent’s history. Pakistan’s larger tragedy, in fact, is that its strategy has often been crafted by purely tactical minds. That is not how great nations function: their strategy is devised by strategists and implemented by tacticians. But that is a problem the people of Pakistan and its civil society will solve, though in the course of time.

So how should we deal with this new situation? First of all, keep engaging with Pakistan. It is a process that would have been much more effective had it been resumed three months earlier, but still, build on that first meeting. Second, look for where your leverage lies in the region’s new reality. This entire new daydream is predicated upon the Americans being able to fight with some degree of effectiveness for another year or so, so they could find a faction of the Taliban willing to settle. Obama cannot leave Afghanistan as Nixon had fled Vietnam. To fight effectively, he needs every platoon of the forces the Pakistanis had re-deployed to the west from their classical eastern, India-facing posture. This has also been made possible by some Indian cooperation. For example, if India had moved even one division towards the border after 26/11, this entire game would have been upset. India now has to let the Americans and the British know that if there is another major terror attack, it may just be constrained to return to its traditional counter-terror gambit, of threatening Pakistan with a conventional response. Just a division, a few squadrons of multi-role aircraft moved westwards would have the Pakistanis rolling back all the divisions from their west to the east. This is the last thing Obama wants, and this is our most important leverage. He cannot be allowed to take our vital interests for granted.

Of course, this has to be accompanied by one more correction: the end of the six-year complacence on modernising our conventional defence. While it is fashionable to credit nuclear weapons with ensuring peace in the region, the fact is, it was the deterrence of a swift and withering conventional response that kept the Pakistani adventurists in check since 1987. In the past six years that edge has been allowed to erode, and when Manmohan Singh looks back he will be honest enough to acknowledge that as his government’s biggest failure on national security. What kind of country living in such a dangerous neighbourhood returns Rs 10,000 crore of its defence acquisition budget unspent? If Manmohan Singh can simply start fixing that and also let the Americans know that another 26/11 may, just may, see a different response from us, it would be a fine strategic response to this new challenge. It may even ensure peace in the region.


 http://bengalunderattack.blogspot.com/2010_03_01_archive.html

Wednesday 25 January 2012

INDIA – ISRAEL RELATIONS: THE IMPERATIVES FOR ENHANCED STRATEGIC COOPERATION




by Dr.Subhash Kapila

India’s Nehruvian policies kept India and Israel politically apart for over forty years despite sharing many attributes in common. India and Israel emerged as nation states within months of each other. Following India’s emergence as an independent nation on 15 Aug. 1947, Israel emerged as nation state on 14 May 1948, as a result of a decision by the United Nations, the first such nation. India and Israel though comparatively emerging as new nation states were steeped in history of over five thousand years.
India and Israel are democracies and have survived in a sea of hostility, surrounded by implacable adversaries and a heavily militarised security environment. Both nations have fought wars in nearly every decade of their existence. Both countries also have been facing external and internal security threats in the form of Islamic terrorism and sabotage. It should have been therefore natural for India to reach out to Israel in terms of establishment of meaningful political and economic relations. India’s record has been otherwise.
Contemporary global and regional developments now dictate that the distortions of past Indian policies be jettisoned and both countries put value on the imperatives for enhancing their strategic cooperation. Events since 1998 indicate that a beginning has been made.
India – Israel Relations : Indian Policy Distortions of the Early years
India’s policy distortions in its West Asian policies were to say the least, reprehensible and inconsistent with the ground realities. India’s historical record is a sorry one in terms of opposing the creation of Israel as evident from the following facts.1
*  In the Pre-Independence period, Gandhi, Nehru and the Indian National Congress had opposed the creation of a ‘Jewish National Home’.
*  India did not subscribe to the majority plan of United Nations Special Committee on Palestine recommending partition of Palestine.
*  India voted against the admission of Israel into the United Nations in May 1949.
Despite the official line propagated by Nehru, the entire spectrum of India’s Opposition parties from the Left (Communists and Socialist parties of all hues) to the Right (Jan Sangh and Swantantra Party) ceaselessly stressed the need for close political and economic ties with Israel.2
The stubborn opposition to establish diplomatic relations with Israel arose from the Nehru - Gandhi regimes of the Congress Party being captives to domestic compulsions of appeasement of Muslim minorities  (support for Arab causes) and a greed for Muslim votes.  Ironically the first Janata Govt. did not change things either. India’s current Minister of External Affairs had to concede during an address to the Israel Council on Foreign Relations that "India’s Israel policy became a captive to domestic policy that came to be unwillingly as unstated veto to India’s larger West Asian Policy"3. In other words to exclude Israel from all Indian contacts
It is to the credit of the State of Israel and its political maturity that in the emerging deepening of ties between the two countries, Israel has not let this sad record to cloud its views.
India’s Military and Intelligence Contacts with Israel in the Years Before Diplomatic Recognition
Devoid of access to classified documents and entirely by deductive analysis, it becomes apparent that beginning in the 1970’s, India did realise that its West Asian Policies of excluding Israel were wrong. In the military field in India’s critical hour of need of the 1971 war with Pakistan, India sought Israel’s help to supply it with the devastating artillery weapon, 160 mm mortars and ammunition, exclusively manufactured in Israel.
Facilitating such covert Israel aid was that:
"Acting widely as an alternative diplomatic service, the Mossad has opened doors and maintained relations with dozens of countries which prefer that these connections not be known. The Mossad simply gives the other nation an easy way out – receiving military, medical and agricultural advice from the overenthusiastic Israelis without risking economic or political boycotts of the Arab World".4
It also appears that at the about the same time India - Israel intelligence cooperation had commenced. The book under quote sets out lucidly that: "India even more populous was another useful contact point for Meir Amit's Mossad, even though the Indian Government was also unwilling to tell its 800 million Hindu and Muslim people about the secret relationship with the Jewish State. Clandestine cooperation is always based on common interests, leading to an exchange of information. For India and Israel, the common potential enemy was Pakistan – a Moslem nation committed to helping the Arab countries of the Middle East".5
India had yet not given diplomatic recognition to Israel, but in a rare display of pragmatism and need, it began a covert relationship with Israel in the 1970's. Again with no records to go by, it can be safely assumed that covert military and intelligence exchanges should have ensued till 1992.
India – Israel : Formal Diplomatic Relations Establishment, 1992
India accorded formal recognition to Israel in 1950 but continued to resist establishment of formal diplomatic relations till 1992. Probing visits by Israeli officials had taken place to test the temperature in New Delhi ending with the visit of Israel Deputy Director of Israel Foreign Ministry Moshie Yaeger in 1992.6
Following the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1992, India and Israel have signed a number of agreements on economic, scientific, agricultural and cultural matters. Joint Commissions stand established in many of these fields including regular foreign office discussions.
VIP visits also commenced and the important ones till 1998 (those after 1998 will be discussed later) have been those of: 7
Israel
- President Ezer Weizman (Dec 1996). First ever visit by an Israeli President to India, leading a 24 member business delegation. For President Weizman it was a sentimental visit as during the Second World War he was posted as an RAF pilot at Yelahanka, Bangalore.
- Israel Services Chiefs
- Foreign Minister
India
- Services Chiefs
- Dr. A.P.J.Abdul Kalam then Head of DRDO.
- Defence Secretaries
Besides the above a sizeable number of official and business delegations from both countries have visited each other and thus the neglect of earlier years was corrected.
India – Israel : The Imperatives for Strategic Cooperation
For those who still subscribe to the old policies of domestic compulsions in terms of avoiding good relations with Israel, the imperatives for strengthening strategic cooperation needs to be spelt out.
Indian Imperatives – The Defence Field
* Israel offers a valuable autonomous source for purchase of sophisticated weapons and military equipment, indigenously developed; it therefore, precludes external pressures on Israel not to supply.
* Israel’s defence industries have earned a global reputation for upgradation of old weapon systems to latest technological capabilities. It applies to India’s vast holdings of Russian combat aircraft and tanks holdings. Israel has done it for number of countries.
* Israel’s technological advances in the fields of satellites, satellite imagery, missiles, rockets and nuclear fields are appreciable. Most of them being indigenous developments, they can be a source of advanced technology for India.
* Potential exists for India – Israel joint defence production and marketing of conventional military equipment. India’s under - utilised and aging defence production facilities could be modernised and upgraded for export purposes. Export earnings could subsidise India’s requirements for enhanced defence expenditure.
Indian Imperatives – The Intelligence Field
    * Israel from its existence recognised "that they needed excellent intelligence to aid their fight for survival. Their country was among the tiniest on earth but would have to develop the finest services in the world". 8 They have done so in the form of Mossad (Foreign Operations), SHIN BET (domestic security) and AMAN (Army’s Intelligence Agency). Each one of them have acquired global reputation for excellence.9 This was achieved both by the imperatives of national survival and being "a synthesis of various traditions that were learned, adopted, inherited, or copied from other countries that have longer histories as states and more deeply ingrained intelligence customs".10
    * With India facing both internal and external onslaughts from adversaries, India’s intelligence agencies need toning up. Israeli expertise would be invaluable as inputs for strenghtening of India’s intelligence agencies.
    * India is under attack from Islamic fundamentalists. Intelligence exchanges with Israel would provide valuable inputs as Israel too is under similar attacks and has developed considerable expertise in dealing with them.
    * Israeli industries produce hi-tech sensitive gadgetry for intelligence purposes. India could tap this source for its requirements.
    * India’s counter-terrorism mechanisms and responses are poor. Israel experience could help.
India’s Imperatives – The Internal Security Field
    * "Israel is in almost permanent state of war and has been since its birth in May 1948. It is surrounded by hostile nations and a constant, threat so the rules of defence and intelligence must differ from those that apply in America or other Western countries."11 India is in a similar predicament and the Israel experience would be valuable.
    * Israel’s border management and counter – terrorism techniques could help India in getting over its major weaknesses in internal security management.
Israeli Imperatives for Strategic Cooperation With India
The Israeli imperatives may not incorporate a wide a list as the Indian requirements. The major ones are:
*  India offers vast markets for arms sales. India’s weapons and military equipment requirements in the next ten years add upto billions of dollars.
*  India needs autonomous sources of both military equipment and technology in the fields of nuclear power generation, space technology and satellite imagery. Attractive market exists for Israel in India.
*  Cost effective joint defence production.
*  India is a vast market for Israel’s super speciality – agro-tech industries.
*  Israel’s hi-tech industries could find India as an attractive market for sales, transfers and joint production and marketing.
*  Tapping India’s advanced IT industry for both civil and military uses.
Israeli Official Responses for Enhanced Strategic Cooperation with India
In marked contrast to India, Israeli official pronouncements on enhancing ties with India and so also strategic cooperation display an open ended approach.
Bar Illan, Senior Adviser to then Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu made the following statements to a group of Indian journalists in July 1997: 12
* On ties with India "We don’t have any limitations, (in terms of ties with India) we would like it to be as deep and tight and as prolific as possible."
* On defence cooperation: "quite a bit of it is there; there is nothing in the world that cannot be improved."
* On strategic cooperation: "as long as India and Israel are friendly, it is a strategic gain. I hope there is the kind of strategic cooperation that will benefit both."
During President Weizman’s visit to India on Dec 1996, he expressed that Israel was keen on lending expertise in fields of missiles technology and avionics to India. Israel also offered both investment and technical cooperation in production of military aircraft, reverse engineering and upgradation of weapon systems.13
No other nation has made such open offers to India not even those who were India’s strategic partners in earlier years.
 India – Israel Cooperation since 1998
India-Israel cooperation has intensified since 1998 and rightly so. India at long last has pragmatically realised the imperatives of strategic cooperation outlined above and efforts have begun as highlighted by the visits of India’s Home Minister L. K. Advani and India’s External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh to Israel in quick succession in mid 2000.
Indian Home Minister L. K. Advani’s visit to Israel drew much attention in external media both in terms of the composition of the delegation (Heads of India’s intelligence agencies RAW, IB, and central police organisations fighting terrorism) and Advani’s inter-action at the Israel end besides the protocol ones.
The focus of external media was on the emerging India-Israel cooperation in the internal security management field as under: 14
- Advani’s visit was first ever by senior Indian Minister since 1992 and that too a hardliner.
- Advani formalised intelligence sharing and cooperation agreement in his meetings with the MOSSAD Chief and Israel’s Ministers dealing with security.
- Israel supported India’s anti-terrorism efforts. Israeli intelligence agencies would open offices in New Delhi on the lines of United States FBI. Agreement modeled on similar lines.
In terms of India -Israel defence cooperation the following was highlighted:15
- Advani spent a long time with Israeli arms manufacturers besides his discussions with intelligence and border management agencies.
- Israel is willing to share defence technology with India.
- Israeli armaments technology is first class and prices reasonable.
Coverage of Mr. Advani’s visit would be incomplete without quoting the Israeli Ambassador’s impressions about Mr. Advani. He said "Mr. Advani is a very unique man. I like him very much. Ideologically and personally he reminds me of some people from an earlier generation of Israelis."16 Such impressions, presumably, would have fostered meaningful interaction.
The other notable event was the visit by Mr. Jaswant Singh to Israel closely following that of the Home Minister, Major events / discussions during this visit, the first ever visit by an Indian Foreign Minister were:17
- Cooperation in defence and counter – terrorism will hence forth underpin a greater political and strategic dialogue between India and Israel.
- Discussions between the two Foreign Ministers spoke of intensified cooperation in areas ranging from counter – terrorism to Information Technology.
- Israeli Foreign Minister Levy stressed Israel would never back off from its commitments to India.
Both Foreign Ministers additionally agreed/ discussed the following: 18
    - Joint Commission established at Ministerial level for cooperation in combating terrorism. This is in addition to the Foreign Ministers Consultation Process.
    - Strategic discussions will be held every 6 months.
    - Defence purchases were also discussed including the GREEN PINE radar (one of the sub-systems of Israel’s anti-ballistic missile system).
- Additionally visits of India’s National Security Adviser Mr. Brajesh Mishra and Services Chiefs have taken place since 1998 underlining the growing strategic cooperation between India and Israel. In non-strategic areas visits to Israel have taken place in 1998 – 99 from the Indian side by the Ministers of Urban Affairs, Health and Welfare and the Attorney General. 19
The Indian Navy has also conducted goodwill visits by its ships to Israel. INS SHAKTI, INS GOMTI and INS RANVEER visited Port EILAT around March 28, 2000 Senior Indian Naval officers held talks with Israeli defence officials.20
India’s Recent Defence Purchases from Israel and Areas of Potential Interest
Recent defence purchases by India from Israel as reported include the following:
* Artillery Guns 130mm upgradation to 155mm-  180
   (To be done in Israel)
* Artillery Guns 130mm upgradation to 155mm- 250 21
   (To be done in India)

* Battlefield surveillance radars (Artillery) – 250
* Battlefield surveillance radars hand held (Infantry)- unspecified
* Fast attack naval craft Super Davora – 2 plus four to be built in India.
* Electronic Warfare System for INS VIRAT (aircraft carrier)
* 160mm Mortar ammunition - 30,000 rounds
* 130mm artillery gun ammunition - 50,000 rounds
* 125mm shells (for tanks) - 100,000 rounds
* 5.56 mm ammunition for rifles - Unspecified 22

* Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) - 8 in 1999 for surveillance purposes (Army) - 20 in 2000
* Indian Navy (UAV) requirements (Shipborne) - 50 23
* Russian MI 35 helicopter prototype upgradation - 25 24 
with Israeli avionics and night vision devices.
* India seeking defence equipment worth- unspecified number25
$ 200 million to include UAVs, avionics
for IAF SU – 30 MK I, MIG 27 ML, and
JAGUAR upgrades Fire Control radars
During the Kargil War, Israel responded magnificently, despite pressures from various quarters not to supply. UAVs for high altitude surveillance, laser – guided systems and many other items were supplied within 24 hours.26 Israel is reported to have emerged as India’s No.2 defence supplier after Russia, and with costs of Russian spare parts for replacement escalating by 300-500%, Israel may emerge as India’s No. 1 defence supplier. India is presently faced with the daunting prospect of buying immediately $200 million worth of ammunition and further $ 1.5 billion later to make up for losses in recent fires at Indian Army Amunition Depots.27 Israel may be the only source for immediate replacement.
In terms of areas of potential Indian interest in Israeli defence equipment, briefly it can narrow down to the following items.
* Submarine launched cruise missiles.28
* Micro-satellite systems for surveillance which can be launched from aircraft or in clusters from a missile.29
* Laser guided systems and precision – guided mention munitions (PGMs)
* Anti – ballistic missile systems.
* Upgradation of all Soviet – origin aircraft, artillery, tanks etc.
* Radars of all types.30
CONCLUSION
India, at the turn of the millenium seems, to have broken out of the straitjacket of moral histrionics of the last 50 years in terms of its foreign policies and approaches to strategic cooperation. In terms of India’s national interests related to the context of its present external and internal threats, the imperatives of strategic cooperation with countries willing to contribute to enhancement of India’s security, becomes inescapable. Israel as the preceding survey would indicate, is a prime example of a country willing to go the whole length for strategic cooperation with India. That it is willing to do so without pre-conditions or succumbing to pressures from other countries, makes it a safe source for meeting India’s defence needs. India is in dire need today to reform its intelligence apparatus and add teeth to its counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism responses. Israel has expressed its readiness to assist in these fields and can be expected to provide blueprints appropriate to Indian requirements.
United States, Russia and China especially, all have noticeable political, economic and defence cooperation with Israel, currently. Arab countries of West Asia have accepted this pattern. There should be no logical reason for them to be concerned about India - Israel strategic cooperation either. Israel’s practical approaches on India’s close relations with Iran do not also either come in the way. Bar Illan, Senior Adviser to former Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu had commented on this in 1997 that "countries that keep good terms with Israel and at the same time maintain good relations with Iran without providing them arms, could be used as conduits for dialogue" 31 China is a case in instance. India could be a better conduit.
India's national interests are paramount and these dictate the enhancement of India-Israel strategic cooperation. In terms of strategically educating itself from Israeli experience, India could learn to have the will to use power, unapologetically.
1.8.2000

NOTES:
1. BR Nanda Ed. 'India’s Foreign Policy : The Nehru Years', Delhi,Vikas      Publishing Ltd. 1976. P75
2.  Ibid P 69
3.  'Asian Age', New Delhi, July 4, 2000 based on ‘India Abroad News Service’ despatch by P. Jayaram. The item was headlined "Greed for Muslim Votes Restricted all Ties with Israel: Jaswant Blames Politicians for Decades of Estrangement." P 3
4.  Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, 'Every Spy a Prince' – Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990 See Pages 436 and 437.
5.  Ibid P 157
6.  Lt. Gen R. K. Jasbir Singh (retd.) Ed. 'India Defence Year Book 1998 – 1999', Dehradun PP 119 – 120.
7.  Ibid P 119.
8.  'Every Spy a Prince' (1990) PP 1-2.
9.  Ibid P 5.
10.  Ibid P 13.
11.  Ibid P 413.
12.  'India Defence Year Book  1998 – 99'. P 117.
13.  Ibid P 119.
14.  'Far Eastern  Economic Review' June 29, 2000. P 10. Article entitled "India Works with Israeli Intelligence".
15.  'Asiaweek', June 30, 2000. Newsitem entitled "India – Israel Growing Ties."
16.  See 'Outlook' Issue of July 2000. PP 20 – 21. Remarks were made by Israeli Ambassador Dr. Yehoyad Haim. He also highlighted that a very unique affinity exist between Jews and Indians.
17.  'Indian Express', July 3, 2000. P12, Newsitem entitled "India Israel Talk Business."
18.  'Far Eastern Economic Review', July 13, 2000. P 8. Newsitem entitled
"India Shops for Israeli Air Defence".

19.  Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 'Annual Report 1998 – 99'. P 44.
20.  'Janes Defence Weekly (JDW)', April 5, 2000 issue. P15
21.  JDW March 22, 2000 P 14.
22. See JDW issues of May 5, 2000 (P4) and June 9, 2000 (P8).
23.  'Defense News', Vol 15 No. 12. March 27, 2000.
24.  'Flight International', May 19 – 25 1999.
25.  'Aviation Week & Space Technology', October 18, 1999.
26.  'Indian Express' July 3, 2000 P 12.
27.  'Defense News', Vol 15 No. 9, May 15, 2000 P11.
28.  Israeli capabilities can be referred do in 'Every Spy a Prince' (1990) PP423-424.,  Also see JDW, Jul 14, 1999.
29.  For details of Israeli progress in this fields see JDW, March 29, 2000. P24.
30.  Israel has provided a sizeable quantity of battlefield surveillance radars for artillery and infantry. India is interested in missile detection radars. India is also considering Synthetic Aperture Radars (SARs) pods for its MIG27 combat aircraft. See 'Flight International', May 13, 1999.
31.  'India Defence Year Book'  (1998-99). P118.

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