Will the Greatest Future Security Threats to India be from Inside or Outside the Country? - Resolving Internal Security Threats to Compete with China and Other External Future Threats

Will the Greatest Future Security Threats to India be from
Inside or Outside the Country?

Resolving Internal Security Threats to Compete

with China and Other External Future Threats

An essay by Charles Patrick Anderson, Keele University, UK


India is rapidly increasing in importance across the globe. As its economic clout rises, and Indian culture spreads to other countries, the nation’s influence in international affairs becomes ever stronger. As a country moves onto the global stage, however, a certain set of questions become important: what threats will arise in the future of this rise in power? Of particular concern is whether or not increased international standing will raise the external threat level. As part of the Future of Change process, covering the next five years, India is asking these questions. With an unstable Pakistan on the one hand, and a growing China on the other, it seems natural to focus on the external threats as the greatest risk to future success. Yet the reverse is true. 

India faces growing economic and social difficulties, and needs to combat numerous militant groups. At face value, these threats pale into comparison against the strength of China. Yet it is precisely this strength that determines the urgency of these internal threats; China will be India’s rival for decades to come, and a strong base will be needed for India to succeed in this competition. It is only through first focusing on, and resolving, the internal threats that India will gain the capability to maintain a strong external posture.


When it comes to security issues, the question of where the next threat will come from is not rhetorical; formulating a security strategy, outfitting the security apparatus, and developing tactical doctrine all depend on identifying the threat such a process is meant to combat. As such, in order for a security strategy to have any relevance the nature of the threats facing a country must be understood. Yet this understanding somewhat depends on how the question is phrased – the future is a long time, and for a country with a large land border and terrorist groups that operate internally, yet are based externally, separating internal threats from external ones can be difficult. A security strategy depends on clarity for effectiveness, and since this clarity partly stems from the question of what threats a country faces, then the framing of this question requires equal clarity.


The first matter is the timeline to be considered; after all, the threat tomorrow is different from the threat present in 10 years. Given that the Future of Change initiative has a 5 year timeline, it is considered prudent to consider the threats that India will face during the process, from 2011 to 2016.


The question of what constitutes and external threat versus an internal one is less simple; for India, it is not a matter purely of country borders. There are threats that operate within India, but are considered to be based externally. The most infamous group would be Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based militant group, but there are other militant groups based in either Pakistan or the Kashmir region which operate heavily within India. ‘Internal’ groups also interact with other militants outside India, such as the Maoists in Nepal, and the Islamist groups in Bangladesh. These groups are aided in these interactions by the nature of India’s land border. Although the Indian sub-continent is ringed by mountains, there are extensive plains regions within. Apart from border regions within Kashmir and with China, the Indian borders are within these plains. There is therefore no natural boundary to cross-border action, raising the difficulty of border control and easing interactions between threats based within the sub-continent. Yet such interaction does not extend outside these neighbouring countries; the extensive sea border, combined with the difficulty of crossing the mountains of the Indian sub-continent, has prevented infiltration from outside that region.


This fact, combined with the porosity of Indian land borders, suggests that the division of external versus internal threats cannot be based around India’s border. To do so would be rather arbitrary, and would complicate analysis; the various groups operating in and around India maintain a series of sometimes complex interactions that cross borders. To classify them based on borders would ‘cut’ those relationships, thereby weakening the relevance of any strategy based on those classifications. Instead, a classification system should seek to mimic the pattern of interaction between the threats facing a country. With this in mind, the following model will be used: a threat arising from the direct work of another nation-state will be external. Similarly, a threat arising from a non-state actor based outside the Indian sub-continent will be external. A threat from a non-state actor based within the Indian sub-continent (although not necessarily within India’s borders) will be classed as internal. Such a division should keep intact the various interactions that relate various threats to each other.


With the framework of the question now in place, an attempt can now be made to formulate an answer. First up are the external threats. Two nation-states are represented here: China and Pakistan. China has a strong economy, posting 11.9% growth in the first quarter of 2010, and surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest economy. India is expected to achieve annual growth of 9.7% in 2010, making it the fastest growing economy after China. The result is that the two countries are both rising regional and global economic powers, placing them in direct competition. This further translates into resource competition – these developing economies are heavy consumers of oil, a dwindling resource. Water may also become a source of trouble, as several major rivers in north India begin in Tibet. Overshadowing all this is the matter of disputed borders. The 1962 Sino-Indian border dispute saw India lose ground to Chinese forces, and the region is still disputed. Chinese claims to the region have grown stronger over the past year, and troop levels have increased. Moreover, China’s attempt to gain alternate access to the seas through India’s neighbours raises the prospect of alternate sites of confrontation. At heart, the issue is that both India and China are competing for regional and global dominance, and such competition raises the threat level.



Pakistan will continue to pose a threat to India. Despite confidence-building measures between the two nations, potential for conflict remains. Indeed, the U.S. 2010 Joint Force Doctrine stated that the Kashmir dispute “may be the most dangerous disagreement that exists between two nuclear armed powers”. Over 50 ceasefire violations have occurred this year, with two in the space of 24 hours on 29th December 2010. Various conflict triggers exist apart from border clashes; India holds control of rivers in Kashmir which flow into Pakistan, and management of that water could serve as a causus belli. Moreover, Pakistan is home to various terrorist groups which target India, and it is strongly alleged that some of these groups operate with the support of rogue Pakistani intelligence officers, and even Islamabad itself. The 2008 Mumbai attacks were carried out by LeT and planned in Pakistan, while the 2008 Delhi bombings were attributed to Harkat-ul-jihad al-Islami (HuJI), another militant group with ties to Pakistan. It was felt that Indian suspicions were confirmed when former ruler Musharraf admitted that the Pakistani military trained terrorist groups to fight against Indian forces. As such, Pakistan represents a two-tier threat to India: state-based warfare over Kashmir, state-sponsored terrorism by non-state actors.


The internal threats to India encompass a greater range. The most notable threats are the various militant groups that operate in India. Two, LeT and HuJI, have already been mentioned above. These groups consistently operate within India, and are known to execute high-profile, well organised attacks. These attacks not only make use of large-scale IEDs and suicide bombers, but also encompass assassinations and ground assaults against soft targets. Numerous other groups exist within India, based around Islamist terrorism, the Maoist movements, or various regional movements for independence. In 2008 the National Security Advisor, M K Narayanan, stated that there were up to 800 terrorist cells in India. Out of the indigenous groups the Naxalite movement could be said to be the most dangerous; it is present in approximately 200 out of the 600 Indian states, and controls roughly 92,000 km in an area known as the Red Corridor. Furthermore, the movement has shown a willingness to engage with government forces. In 2009 Naxalite forces staged attacks across the West Bengal region, centred in Lalgarh, and paramilitary force was required to regain control of the region. Any of the militant groups mentioned here comprise a credible threat to Indian stability; the presence of numerous groups, which range across borders and interact with each other, represent a strong security risk.



There are internal security factors to consider outside of militant action, however; the economic and social conditions of India. These factors impact upon security in two main ways: by increasing unrest, through either militant or criminal action, and by decreasing the ability of the state to deal with unrest and other security issues. On the face of it, India is going from strength to strength. Yet the rapid growth of India is threatened by a lack of reform in both industry and government. Moreover, approximately 700 million Indians earn under $2 a day, and the high economic growth has failed to improve such crucial areas such as healthcare and food security. In short, a significant underclass remains who have not benefited from Indian growth. Moreover, corruption within government and a lack of political connectivity with this class has led to social unrest. One sign of this is the continuing strength of internal dissident movements. Indeed, it might be said that India has succeeded despite its problems, not because of its strengths. Moreover, the social and economic problems feed into the continuing work of militant groups; unless India rectifies the social imbalance, the militants will retain support among those on the wrong end of the wealth gap. At the same time, inefficiencies in industry threaten future Indian growth. Misallocation of resources has lead rural areas to underperform, and managerial inadequacies are increasing obstacles to growth. At the same time, internal competition needs to increase if India is to be able to compete externally.


Here, then, are the two groups: an external threat situation characterised by growing rivalry with China and ongoing tensions with Pakistan, and an internal situation that encompasses various militant groups along with economic and social security issues. Given that a confrontation between two nuclear powers could be catastrophic in its impact, it would be natural to emphasize the external sphere as holding the greatest threat to India. Yet this is not the case; if India is to improve its security situation during the next five years, it must look internally. The reasons for this are two-fold: firstly, the external threat situation is not as grave as it would initially appear. Pakistan is politically weak, and the recent floods have placed great strains upon the economy. Alongside this, the U.S. government has been placing increasing pressure on Pakistan to deal with militant groups within its borders. The efforts of Pakistan to deal with such terrorists, whether or not they have been effective, has served to turn them against Islamabad and created internal conflict. With rising economic and social distress, and increasing militant action within its borders, Pakistan is facing inwards. It is too weak, both militarily and politically, to pose a threat to India within the next few years.


Nor is China an immediate threat; although claims over the disputed territories have become more strident, this is a natural part of China exploring its growing international influence. Military action is unlikely – the mountainous nature of that area makes concerted action difficult, and the improvements in the Indian military would make any conflict costly for Chinese forces, which would add to the severe political cost. Moreover, although both countries will compete for dominance in the future, they are both finding their feet at the moment. It is worth noting that Chinese growth will most likely slow over the next few years, as they work to deal with rising inflation (5.1% in November 2010, a 25 month high), higher prices, and an economy that is too reliant on construction and manufacturing. Given the $16bn worth of deals negotiated during Wen Jiabao’s recent visit, and two-way trade volume worth approximately $60bn, China may actually be using India to help maintain economic growth. In any event, China is more likely to be focused on ensuring economic smooth sailing over the next five years than increasing competition, and therefore increasing the threat level, with India.


The internal threats on the other hand, hold far more urgency, and will have an impact within the five-year period. Militant action remains strong within India, and with cells present in almost half of the 600 states, it is unlikely to decrease. There are also doubts about the ability of the state to manage terrorism, largely due to a lack of the resources and organisation required to police numerous groups across a wide area of land. In particular, there is a lack of co-ordination and intelligence sharing among the numerous police and military units involved in counter-terrorism. The same is true of organised crime; not only do traditional criminal enterprises, such as smuggling, pose a serious problem for India, but the increase in cybercrime raises concerns for an industry worth $70bn to the Indian economy.


Equally, economic and social malaise presents long-term problems. The issue here is not just an increase in social and political unrest, as serious as they are; just as combating terrorism and organised crime drain resources, economic inefficiencies deny resources to a growing state.  This feeds into a growing concern: at some point in the future, India is going to look to claim an influential place in the world. Yet competition for that place will be fierce. More importantly, India’s closest rival for global influence, China, is also it’s closest. This will not be a contest between two regional powers for global power; rather, it will be a contest for regional power, and the successor will go on to take the stronger role in world affairs. India will need to be politically stable, as a disenfranchised underclass and militant violence will leave the country unfocused. And it needs to be economically strong, so that it can hold its own with what could one day be the world’s largest economy, China. It is this need to be strong and stable that makes the internal threats the greatest. Not only do they create significant short-term worry for India, but the manner of their resolution will determine what sort of place the country will hold in the world after this five year period. Only by resolving these internal threats can India hope to be strong externally.


At this point it is worth briefly examining what sort of threats will be most important when considering India’s future after the timeline considered here, especially since the urgency of the internal threats relates to what will occur after these five years. What will take place in a future period is to a large extent determined by what actions are taken in the intervening time. As such, India’s greatest far future threat will largely depend on whether or not the country is successful in dealing with the internal threats in the near future. It will be assumed, however, that India deals competently with its militant and economic problems. With this in mind, the far future threat to India becomes clear: China. At some point around 2025 it is reckoned that the Chinese economy could surpass America’s to become the largest in the world. The large Chinese ground and air forces will be complemented by a carrier-based expeditionary navy. The final development and deployment of the anti-ship version of the Dong Feng 21D ballistic missile will ensure Chinese naval dominance in its home waters, and strategically placed bases in overseas territories will extend the influence into Indian waters among others.


Figure 4: Map showing the range of the anti-ship ballistic missile, listed here as the CSS-5. Also indicates possible ranges if other missile systems are used.
The two economies will also begin to compete for oil, gas, and water resources, as their large demand comes up against increasing scarcity. Chinese attempts to move away towards an economy based on services and high-tech industry will cause it to come into increasing competition with Indian companies. Currently China is focused on Japan, its current economic rival, but within time that country will fall far enough behind that Chinese eyes will turn elsewhere. In short, in 2020 and beyond both India and China will hold strong and stable places in the world economy. The task then will be converting those positions into stable and dominant political positions. The E.U. and America will still prove powerful competitors, but the proximity of China and India will lend a special emphasis to their rivalry.
Such rivalry is unlikely to extend into military conflict; in a multi-polar world initiating large-scale conflict would incur significant costs for the aggressor. Yet it will require deft political manoeuvring, and a stable economic base. Such a view of the far future throws the near future threat situation into sharp relief.  Internal dynamics significantly affect external power, and in time India will have need of that power. In other words, India will have to be internally strong if it is to take hold of all opportunities in the next decade and beyond. That strength will only be in place, however, if it deals with the internal threats that will be present in the next five years. It is for this reason that the greatest and most urgent threats to India’s future security will be internal. Only through confronting them will India be capable of dealing with the coming external threats.

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The essay posted here represents the views of the author only and not of INDIA Future of Change.

This is one of the winning essays from the INDIA Future of Change Essay-Writing Contest 2010-11 as evaluated by Financial Times, the knowledge partner for the contest.

 http://www.indiafutureofchange.com/featureEssay_D0091.htm