It
is often stated that at the strategic level, one requires a long memory and a
longer foresight and vision. There are many people in India who have a tendency
to overlook the Sino-Pak strategic nexus in the dialogue over India’s
boundaries with these two countries. Boundaries are a manifestation of national
identity. Disputed boundaries are often trip-wires of war.
It
is, therefore, necessary to place this issue in its historical and futuristic
perspective.
Soon
after its Independence in 1949, China set out consolidating its historic
frontiers and placing administrative authority and military boots on the ground
in Tibet and Xinjiang. India did not do so and rues till date this Himalayan
blunder in strategic terms. India’s northern boundary from the
Sino-India-Afghanistan tri-junction to the Sino-India-Nepal tri-junction on the
maps remained marked with the legend ‘Boundary Undefined’ till 1954. No serious
attempt was made to establish administrative authority or place military boots
on the ground in this area.
On
July 1, 1954, Nehru ordered, “All old maps dealing with the frontier should be…
withdrawn… new maps should not state there is any undemarcated territory… this
frontier should be considered a firm and definite one which is not open to
discussion with anybody.” By then, China had placed its military boots in Tibet
and Aksai Chin and started the construction of a strategic road connecting
Tibet to Xinjiang (China National Highway 219). Construction of this strategic
road, started in 1951 but not noticed by India till 1955, was completed in
1957. It was seen in the Chinese maps published in 1958.
Nehru
tried to justify the loss of Aksai Chin by calling it ‘a desolate area where
not a blade of grass grows’. Nevertheless, it became one of the triggers for
the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
Soon
after the war, China began Xinjiang boundary negotiations with Pakistan. This
was a period when both China and Pakistan were upset over the post 1962 war US
military assistance to India. They signed the Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement in
1963 in which Pakistan ceded Shaqsgam Valley of the Northern Areas (J&K
territory, under occupation of Pakistan) to China. This agreement described the
eastern termination of the Sino-Pakistan boundary at Karakoram Pass. Pakistan
promptly delineated NJ 9842 on the Soltoro Range towards the North East to
Karakoram Pass, ignoring “thence north to the glaciers” statement of the 1948
Karachi Agreement between India and Pakistan. The result: Karakoram Pass, till
then on the boundary between India and China, now had a third party access and
claimant.
China
maintained a studied silence over the Pakistani cartographic manipulation. It
continued to show the area north of Karakoram Pass as being under China.
Meanwhile, Pakistan and China started building the Karakoram Highway, linking
Xinjiang to Pakistan through the northern areas.
Pakistan’s
cartographic manipulation was followed up in international mountaineering
journals and Western atlases. It started sending civil and military
mountaineering expeditions to the mountain peaks and glaciers in this area.
It
would be noted that the Chinese were willing to negotiate and settle the
boundary issue of J&K (west of Karakoram Pass) with Pakistan. But they have
refused to discuss that boundary with India on the ground of its being
‘disputed’. That ‘dispute’ did not come in the way of their negotiations with
Pakistan.
In
April 1984, India reacted to these developments and intelligence reports about
Pakistan Army plans to deploy troops in the Siachen glacier area by occupying
the Soltoro Ridge (now called the Actual Ground Position Line or AGPL) to
secure the glacier and the territory to its east.
This
deployment (a) dominates Pakistani positions in the valley west of Soltoro
Ridge (b) blocks infiltration possibilities across the Soltoro Ridge passes
into Ladakh (c) prevents Pakistani military adventurism in Turtuk and areas to
its south. Its northernmost position at Indira Col overlooks the Shaqsgam
Valley, illegally ceded by Pakistan to China, and denies Pakistani access to
Karakoram Pass and beyond that to Aksai Chin.
In
1987, China and Pakistan signed the protocol to formalise the demarcation of
their boundary. Its termination at Karakoram Pass and Pakistani recognition of
Chinese sovereignty over Aksai Chin clearly indicated an understanding between
them. In the late 1980s, China started assisting Pakistan on the development of
nuclear weapons, long-range missiles and in large-scale sale of conventional
weapons and equipment.
In
1997, China agreed to send its military commander opposite Ladakh to meet his
India counterpart in Leh as a confidence-building measure. Near the date, it
was proposed that the meeting be held in New Delhi instead of Leh. It had to be
called off. After the Kargil war, military attaches from all countries except
Pakistan were invited for a conducted tour of the battle zone. The Chinese
attaché declined that invitation.
Three
years ago, China started issuing “stapled visas” to visitors from J&K, thus
bringing into question its status as part of India. It refused a visa to the
GOC-in-C, Northern Command, who was to make an official visit to China as a
part of ongoing military-level exchanges. It has now increased its civil and
military presence in the northern areas, purportedly to improve infrastructure
there. Among the infrastructure reconstruction projects to be given priority
are those related to the repair and upgradation of the Karakoram Highway, which
was damaged in 2009. China also plans to construct railway tracks and oil
pipelines from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar port in Pakistan.
In
December 2010, while addressing a joint session of the Pakistan parliament,
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated: “To cement and advance the all-weather
strategic partnership of cooperation between China and Pakistan is our common
strategic choice…The two neighbouring countries are brothers forever.
China-Pakistan friendship is full of vigour and vitality, like a lush tree with
deep roots and thick foliage. China-Pakistan
relationship is strong and solid, like a rock standing firm despite the passage
of time.”
Recently,
India and Pakistan resumed talks over the Siachen glacier issue. As in the
past, Pakistan refuses to authenticate the AGPL and the existing troops’
positions and demands the Indian troops’ withdrawal to the pre-1972 position
i.e. to the east of the line joining NJ 9842 and Karakoram Pass. Pakistan had
formally authenticated the line of control in 1949 and 1972 but has
consistently refused this position. The strategic consequences of a deal
without such a formal authentication are obvious. Besides, it will re-introduce
China into the end game because of its illegal control over the Shaqsgam
Valley.
Without
formal authentication of the AGPL, how does one detect any future encroachment
into this area? It must be stated categorically that no amount of existing
technology can have fool-proof surveillance and capability to detect
small-scale infiltration, which is sufficient to hold and defend a tactical
feature in this terrain. Can India afford to forego the strategic significance
of the Soltoro position due to the financial cost-benefit ratio analyses? Or
because not a blade of grass grows in the area? (Then why put up the Indian
flag at Gangotri in South Pole?) Can India trust Pakistan to the extent of
foregoing formal authentication of the AGPL after what Gen Pervez Musharraf did
across the formally delineated LoC in Kargil? Our negotiators must keep all
these points in mind in their discussions with Pakistani counterparts.
In
his latest book On China, Henry Kissinger states that China’s strategy
generally exhibits three characteristics: meticulous analysis of long-term
trends, careful study of tactical options and detached exploration of
operational decisions”. He describes the Chinese style of dealing with
strategic decisions as “thorough analysis, careful preparations, attention to
psychological and political factors, quest for surprise, and rapid conclusion.”
There is much that our political leaders and officials can learn from China’s
strategic thinking.
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General VP Malik is a former Chief of Army Staff
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