India has a moral
commitment on Tibet - I
The
govt has to be firm with China
Not Freeze; But Actively
Discuss Border
-
Ram Madhav
In
1980 when Deng Xiaoping suggested sector-wise approach to resolving the border
conflict between India and China it was presumed that he was only resuming
Zhou’s line. However when the border talks began in 1981 Indian side got clear
indications that the Chinese are pursuing a maximalist approach. By 1985 when
the 6th round of talks began the Chinese had started making open claims over
Tawang in particular and Arunachal Pradesh in general.
For
the Chinese, the obvious policy appears to be to get the maximum territorial
advantage of the talks. That is the reason behind their constant harping on
Arunachal Pradesh. Even there the initial claims were only over the Tawang
region.
Till
the 60s the Chinese were talking about a bilateral settlement on Aksai Chin.
The 38,000 sq. km. area part of Ladakh region came under illegal occupation of
the Chinese Red Army, which started constructing the Karakoram Highway linking
Tibet with Sinkiang region in the 50s.
Zhou
Enlai, the then Premier of China, convinced Jawaharlal Nehru that the McMahon
Line is an ‘imperial leftover’ and hence China and India should reject it.
Under Krishna Menon Plan in 1960 it was even proposed that India should agree
for the Chinese control over Aksai Chin while the Chinese on their part would
agree for something ‘closer’ to McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh.
This,
obviously, was not acceptable to India because China was conspiring to annex
Indian territory in exchange for another Indian territory. The proposal failed;
war followed; and we formally lost control over the Aksai Chin region.
Subsequently
Sikkim became the theatre of conflict. While India was engaged in a war with
Pakistan in 1965 the Chinese PLA was actively making incursions into the Indian
territory in Sikkim along the Tibetan border. China blamed India for preventing
its sheep from grazing inside the Indian territory, which led to the
incursions. There were skirmishes between September and December in 1965 in
that region.
Tensions
continued along the Sikkim-Tibet border where there was armed conflict in
September 1967 near Nathu La Pass when the PLA tried to cross the border in
large numbers. Indian troops had successfully repulsed these advances.
By
the 80s, the theatre shifted to the eastern sector and Arunachal Pradesh became
the new arena of conflict. While under the so-called Krishna Menon Plan the
Chinese were willing to agree for the Indian claims in the eastern region in
exchange for Aksai Chin, in 80s they started making fresh claims over Arunachal
Pradesh.
In
1980 when Deng Xiaoping suggested sector-wise approach to resolving the border
conflict between India and China it was presumed that he was only resuming
Zhou’s line. However, when the border talks began in 1981 Indian side got clear
indications that the Chinese are pursuing a maximalist approach. By 1985 when the 6th round of talks began the Chinese had
started making open claims over Tawang in particular and Arunachal Pradesh in
general.
What
followed gives a clear idea of the Chinese method. There were major border
violations by China in 1987 in the Sumdorong Chu Valley where the Chinese had
penetrated deep into the Indian territory and constructed a helipad and started
bringing in reconnaissance. This had led to a major military build-up and an
eyeball-to-eyeball positioning of both the troops.
Tensions
ran very high for several years until the Narasimha Rao regime signed a treaty
with the Chinese Government in 1993. In a way this treaty too could be called a
victory for the Chinese side, as it had resulted in both Indian and Chinese
troops moving out of the Sumdorong Chu Valley and leaving it a neutral region.
Once again while the Chinese had to vacate the territory that they occupied the
Indians were forced to vacate what belonged to them. Almost five decades of
efforts to resolve the border issues had resulted only in India conceding every
time and ending up as the loser. Zhou talked of a ‘package deal’; Deng talked
of sector-wise approach. We today see neither of them to be relevant anymore.
Of the 2500-km border only peaceful sector is the middle one-namely the
Tibet-Uttarakhand/Himachal border, which is not more than about 550 km.
The
Chinese refuse to talk anymore about the Aksai Chin. For them it is a settled
fact. What is unfortunate is that even our own leadership stopped talking about
it. Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988; Narasimha Rao in 1993 and Vajpayee in
2003. The nation has not heard them talk about the occupation despite the fact
that there is a unanimous Parliament resolution of 1962 on getting that
territory back.
For
the Chinese, the obvious policy appears to be to get the maximum territorial
advantage of the talks. That is the reason behind their constant harping on
Arunachal Pradesh. Even there the initial claims were only over the Tawang
region. These claims were based on the so-called historical aspects like the
birth of the 6th Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso there.
But
now the claims extend to the entire state of Arunachal. In 2006, just a couple
of weeks ahead of the visit of the Chinese President Hu Jintao to India, the
Chinese Ambassador to Delhi Sun Yuxi had made the outrageous claim that
Arunachal Pradesh belonged to China. “In our position the whole of what you
call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory, and Tawang (district)
is only one place in it. We are claiming all of that-that’s our position,” he
told the news channel CNN-IBN. India forced China
to call him back. But the events after his return make it amply clear that the
Chinese have their eyes firmly set on that state.
For
China the McMahon Line is only an excuse. This so-called ‘imperialist line’ is
the one that demarcates the border between Myanmar and China. It is thus clear
that it either intends to occupy more Indian territory or use it as a
bargaining chip for something else. The big question is: What could that
something else be?
One
of the most contentious issues between India and China has been the presence of
His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his people on the Indian soil. Although
successive Indian Governments, starting with Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954, have
conceded directly or indirectly that Tibet is a part of China, the Chinese
harbour serious apprehensions. They see in HH the Dalai Lama not a venerable
saintly figure but a ‘divisive politician’. They are convinced that it was His
Holiness and the agents of the West that were responsible for the recent
uprising in Tibet and apprehend more trouble in future.
India
on its part tries to mollycoddle China by assuring it that its soil wouldn’t be
allowed to be used for any anti-China activities. Yet the suspicions remain.
They knew about the tremendous popularity HH the Dalai Lama enjoys in Tibet
even to this day despite his exile for almost half-a-century. In the 80s, when
his representatives were allowed by the Chinese authorities to visit Tibet,
they received unprecedented and spontaneous welcome. That must have rattled the
Chinese leadership.
The
Chinese attitude towards the Dalai Lama and his people hardened quite a bit
after that, which continues to this day. No effort is spared by China to
browbeat countries that extend an invitation to HH the Dalai Lama. Very
recently it pressurised Sri Lanka into withdrawing its invitation to him. All
this in spite of the fact that countries like India categorically declared that
Tibet is an internal matter of China.
This
brings us to the most crucial aspect of India-China relations-i.e. the Tibetan
exiles including the Dalai Lama, not Tibet. This shift from Tibet to the
Tibetans is very important today.
For
India the critical issue is its sovereignty. The Government has to be firm on
that question. The policy of freezing border question and addressing all other
issues like bilateral trade and cultural exchanges etc no longer works. It has
to sit down and seriously work on the demarcation of the border by exchanging maps.
While doing that we must act as equals, not as subordinates or inferiors.
What
plagues Indian establishment is the utter lack of unanimity in the ruling
establishment. Reports suggest serious differences between the PMO and the MEA
on one side and the Defence Ministry and the Home Ministry on the other.
India
has a moral and ethical commitment to HH the Dalai Lama and his people. Every
Indian wants them to realise their dream of a return to their homeland but with
dignity and honour. India is duty-bound to help in that process. Unfortunately
our Government has completely abdicated that duty. It is only the American
official visitors who raise the question of Tibet with their Chinese
counterparts; we seldom do that.
Just
to reiterate: It is no longer the question of Tibet; it is the question of the
Tibetans now.
-
Ram Madhav is a Member of the Central Executive of RSS and Director of Bharat
Prakashan
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